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Preface: On the Essence of the Parable
§1
“A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell into the 
hands  of  robbers,  who  stripped  him,  beat  him,  and  went  away, 
leaving him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going down that 
road;  and  when he saw him,  he passed  by on  the  other  side.  So 
likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by 
on the other side. But a Samaritan while traveling came near him; 
and when he saw him, he was moved with pity. He went to him and 
bandaged his wounds, having poured oil and wine on them. Then he 
put him on his own animal, brought him to an inn, and took care of 
him.  The  next  day  he  took  out  two  denarii,  gave  them  to  the 
innkeeper, and said, “Take care of him; and when I come back, I will 
repay you whatever more you spend.””
-Luke 10.30-351
To undertake a study of parable is perhaps to arouse confusion and skepticism.  As a 
colleague once questioned, “parables, aren't those a little outdated?” It seems as though parables are 
condemned to conjure up images of wise old sages, baffling disciples and apprentices with bizarre 
and generally unexplained stories.  As Kafka writes, “Many complain that the words of the wise are 
always merely parables and of no use in daily life, which is the only life we have.”2  
Nonetheless, parables remain an integral tool of religious education, direction, and practice. 
Crossing ethnic, cultural, and religious bounds, these simple stories can be found in Christianity, 
Buddhism, Sufism, Kabbalism, Hassidism, and even the atheistic existentialism of Franz Kafka. 
Moreover, the importance of the parable within Christianity is further exaggerated by the primordial 
nature of these stories.  As Robert Funk notes, “the parables are usually taken to be the most 
authentic material we have from the lips of Jesus.”3
Yet, if parables can truly be found across religious and cultural bounds, and furthermore, if 
          1 NRSV.
          2 [Emphasis added] Whether this concern reflects Kafka's own thought is unclear for two reasons.  First, Kafka 
places this claim in the mouths of an ambiguous “many,” a seemingly negative attribution for an existentialist writer 
of individuality. Second, Kafka himself was an author of at least 2 parables.  Franz Kafka, “On Parables' in The 
Complete Stories (New York: Schocken Books, 1971): 457.
          3 Robert W. Funk, “Saying and Seeing: Phenomenology of Language and the New Testament.” Journal of Bible  
and Religion, Vol. 34 No. 3 (Jul. 1966): 206-207.
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the stories presented within these individual traditions are themselves varied and diverse, in what 
possible sense can we hope or expect to identify an “essence” of parable?  Is it not possible that 
“parable” represents nothing more than a vague linguistic category into which a motley collection 
of otherwise unique stories are placed?  To these concerns we must respond with Chrétien that, “to 
decree a phenomenon meaningless is to too easily dismiss having to think about its meaning, and 
first of all having to describe it such as it appears and gives itself."4  Certainly, it cannot be denied 
that parables have appeared.  We hear them spoken: we read them in our religious texts and in our 
poetry.  As individuals, these works cannot be denied.  More strongly, however, it is also the 
assertion of this investigation that these texts are bound together by more than mere convention.  As 
Schelling argued in the opening of his infamous lectures on mythology, “there is something 
common and in agreement in all of them.”5
The founding intuition of our search for the essence of parable can be found in Ray L. Hart's 
unpublished essay, Meister Eckhart: Nothing if not God; if God, Nothing; if Godhead, Nothingness 
Hyper-on.  There, Hart makes the assertion that  “no proof of any kind is offered by scriptural 
parables or by a parabolic reading of scripture.  Parables show, they do not prove.”6  Such an 
assertion merely begs the question, what does the parable show, when it shows?  Although 
seemingly banal, an answer to this question is neither quickly nor easily ascertained.  Nevertheless, 
this thesis does provide a single clue by which our investigation might find its genesis: specifically, 
the simple word “show.”  If our investigation is to discover that which shows itself, that which 
appears or is manifest, then there seems a single route which might provide the appropriate 
methodological framework, that is, phenomenology.  
          4 Jean-Louis Chrétien, “The Wounded Word: Phenomenology of Prayer” in French Phenomenology and the 
“Theological Turn”: The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001): 152
          5 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology 
(SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy) (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008): 9.
          6 Ray L. Hart, Meister Eckhart: Nothing if not God; if God, Nothing; if Godhead, Nothingness Hyper-on (N.p.: 
forthcoming.): 5.
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As a side note, before we commence our proper investigation, certain key figures who will 
recur consistently throughout this work should be noted.  First, Husserl and Heidegger, generally 
noted respectively as the founders of transcendental and existential phenomenology, will be 
engaged both positively and negatively throughout this investigation.  Second, references to the 
“French phenomenologists” will be common, particularly in our opening discussion.  This group, 
composed primarily of Levinas, Marion, Henry, Lacoste, and Chrétien, is noted for its “theological 
turn”; that is, the adoption of theological and religious content and methodology within a 
phenomenological framework.  Of particular note is Michel Henry, who functions as one of the 
primary interlocutors of this work.  Last, a great debt is owed to the Christian medieval mystical 
theologians who's insights have been greatly drawn upon.  Of particular note is Meister Eckhart, 
who will make noteworthy appearances throughout the text.
§2
In order to clarify our project, it may be helpful to begin our investigation with a brief 
sketch of the origin and basic theses of phenomenology.  Particularly, it may be helpful to examine 
the complex and often dialectical relationship within the thought of Edmund Husserl and Martin 
Heidegger.  
A truly 20th century philosophy, phenomenology was founded by Husserl in his 1900/1901 
The Logical Investigations.  While the roots of phenomenology can be traced to Immanuel Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason and Rene Descartes' rationalism, Husserl's work represents a distinct 
philosophical development.  Unhappy with the “idealistic” bent of European thought at the turn of 
the century, particularly as represented by Neo-Kantianism, Husserl sought to develop a philosophy 
which would permit a return to the fundamental objects of human experiences, the “things 
themselves” [der sachen selbst].  In this way, Husserl intended to found a science of human 
consciousness by which the objects of human experience—phenomena—could be studied as they 
show themselves, as they are given to the individual.  In an early essay he writes, “Only an 
vi
originary social science can arrive at an explicit understanding and a real clarification of them 
[phenomena]; that is, a social science that brings social phenomena to direct givenness and 
investigates them according to their essence.”7  
Beginning with his 1910-1911 lectures, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Husserl 
underwent a “transcendental turn.”  This movement, cauterized in his Ideas I, takes the form of a 
rejection of pre-philosophical naïveté and an emphasis upon the immanent region of “pure 
consciousness.”  He writes, “we shall therefore keep our regard fixed upon the sphere of 
consciousness and study what we find immanently within it.”8  This emphasis, alternately notated 
as the epoché ( ποχή) ἐ or the phenomenological (or transcendental) reduction, results in a 
“bracketing” of all transcendent (external) Being.  “I am exercising the “phenomenological” ποχήἐ  
which also completely shuts me off from any judgment about spatiotemporal factual being.”9  It is 
precisely this transcendental turn which motivated Heidegger's counter-development of Existential 
Phenomenology.  
Heidegger began his career as Husserl's brightest and most promising student, assisting him 
with many notable projects, including his Encyclopedia Britannica article “Phenomenology,” and 
the lectures on The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.  Nonetheless, beginning with 
Being Time, Heidegger can be seen to significantly diverge from Husserl's transcendental idealism. 
Fearing that Husserl's later work had, like its predecessors, lost touch with the living experience of 
reality, Heidegger sought to “reopen the brackets of Being”; that is to say, he rejected the 
phenomenological epoché.  Instead, Heidegger developed his “Dasein analytic,” a theory which 
emphasizes being-in-the-world as the fundamental mode of human life.  For Heidegger, the human 
experience can never be understood by bracketing the naive or non-reflective world; instead, it is 
          7 Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy trans. 
Quentin Lauer (New York; Harper & Row Publishers, 1965):93.
          8 Edmund Husserl, "The Basic Approach of Phenomenology" in The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in  
Transcendental Phenomenology (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999): 66.
          9 Husserl, 'The Basic Approach of Phenomenology": 65.
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precisely this world which function's as the subject of philosophical (i.e. phenomenological) 
inquiry. 
This distinction between Transcendental and Existential Phenomenology is essential to our 
investigation.  While Husserl's thought will be rigorously engaged throughout this work, it is the 
presuppositions of Existential Phenomenology which will primarily guide our thought.  Like 
Heidegger, parables and their authors are concerned solely with living individuals and their 
movement through the world.  Therefore, the essence of parable will not be found through a 
bracketing or reduction of this experience, but precisely through an examination of the world of 
individual human life.  
With these clarifications in mind, we are now in the position to begin the first movement of 
our investigation, an analysis of the relationship between phenomenology and theology. In 
particular, we will next consider the very possibility of phenomenological theology itself.  
viii
Chapter 1
Prolegomena to a Phenomenological Theology
I. Introduction
“What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the 
Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? Our instruction 
comes from “the porch of Solomon,” who had himself taught that “the Lord should 
be  sought  in  simplicity  of  heart.” Away  with all  attempts  to  produce  a  mottled 
Christianity  of  Stoic,  Platonic,  and  dialectic  composition!  We  want  no  curious 
disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! 
With our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary faith, that there is 
nothing which we ought to believe besides.” 
-Tertullian10
These rhetorical questions, proclaimed by Tertullian in the third century, have rung 
throughout the history of Christian theology. Even as early as St. Paul of Tarsus we find a similar 
condemnation of philosophy—“the wisdom of the world.”11  Yet, the history of Christian thought is 
saturated with philosophical perspectives, concepts, and methods.  Could we even conceive of a 
Pseudo-Dionysius without Plotinus, Aquinas without Aristotle, Tillich without Heidegger?  The 
histories of Christian theology and Western philosophy form such a tightly bound knot that it seems 
an impossible task to even consider delimiting them.  Nonetheless, the question of the legitimacy of 
theological appropriation of philosophical method and content remains a principal concern among 
philosophers and theologians alike.12  Nowhere has this question become more pressing than within 
phenomenology.  With the increasing popularity of such religiously disposed thinkers as Levinas 
and Marion, it has been left to phenomenology to sort out the precise limits of its own discourse: an 
increasingly difficult task, as Material and Radical Phenomenology continue to press the bounds of 
the discipline.  Further complicating the issue, writers—whose individual projects bear marked 
          10 Tertullian, “The Prescription Against Heretics” in Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. III, Anti Marcion. Trans. By Peter 
Holmes: Chapt. VII.
          11 1st Corinthians 1.20.
          12 Naturally, it must be recognized that this is by no means the one-way street that Kant envisioned in his 
Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.  On the contrary, the philosophical appropriation of theological 
concepts has become a deeply felt concern in the continental tradition, particularly within phenomenology and 
deconstruction. Immanuel Kant, “Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason' in Religion and Rational  
Theology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 62.
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2similarities in theological content—often self-identify in contradictory manners: e.g. Henry as 
solely a philosopher,13 Lacoste as simultaneously philosopher and theologian,14 and Marion as 
both, but at different times.15  Nonetheless, in such intentionally phenomenological texts as 
Experience and the Absolute, we see a convergence of phenomenology and theology to such 
an extent that “the supposed border between these two kinds of knowledge tends to 
disappear.”16  This merely begs the question: is a truly phenomenological theology 
legitimately possible, or in the words of Janicaud, “What is questionable, from the 
methodological point of view, is the status of phenomenology—and of the phenomenological
—between a metaphysics that has been “overcome” (or challenged) and a theology that has 
been made possible (at once prepared and held in reserve).”17  Nonetheless, the emergence of 
this sort of self-questioning should present little surprise; for as Henry noted, phenomenology 
has, since its inception, been plagued by an “obsession with a radical self-awareness.”18  In 
the first chapter of our investigation, we will therefore examine this question, engaging three 
of its most relevant critiques.  The first, found in the originators of phenomenology, Husserl 
and Heidegger, relies upon the distinction between transcendence and immanence.  The 
second, formulated by Dominic Janicaud and Jacques Derrida, challenges the legitimacy of 
any “phenomenology of the invisible,” particularly as it has manifested in Levinas, Henry, 
and Marion.  The third, offered by Marion himself, decisively splits phenomenology from 
theology through the dichotomy of “possibility” and “historicity” (i.e. facticity).  Through 
          13 Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Towards a Philosophy of Christianity, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003): 1.
          14 Jean-Yves Lacoste, "From Theology to Theological Thinking," Fall 2010 Richard Lecture Series 
University of Virginia, November 3-5 2010.
          15 Jean-Luc Marion, “Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology” Critical Inquiry No. 20 
(Summer 1994): 590 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991): 1.
          16  Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute,  (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004): 1.
          17 Dominic Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate, (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2000): 52.
          18  Michel Henry, Material Phenomenology, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008): 44.
3these examinations it will be shown that not only is phenomenological theology a possibility, 
but that it can be enacted both within the theological spirit and with full philosophical rigor. 
Let us now commence with an analysis of the origin of this complex relationship between 
theology and phenomenology as begun in the early 20th century.  
II. Critiques of Phenomenological Theology
§1
Already, in the 1900 founding of Transcendental Phenomenology, the Logical  
Investigations, one can clearly perceive the suppression of theological inquiry.  Such a 
position falls unquestionably from Husserl’s epoché.  As we have briefly noted, the epoché 
(i.e. the phenomenological reduction) results in a bracketing of transcendence, that is to say, 
one no longer presupposes the existence of the object of thought.  Perhaps best illustrated in 
an example drawn from perception, let us consider the act by which a table is perceived.  A 
pseudo-Cartesian skeptic might argue that it is fully possible that a perceived table does not 
exist “in reality”: it is perhaps merely an illusion.  Yet, following the epoché such an 
argument is essentially irrelevant.  Whether the table exists in reality, or merely in illusion, 
the act of perceiving as such remains identical.  Phenomenology, for which this reduction 
remains a foundational principle,19 is a science of conscious acts and must therefore hold the 
transcendent actuality of objects as fundamentally irrelevant.  The theological consequences 
of such a position are easily identifiable.  Traditionally defined as an “Absolutely 
Transcendent Being,” the question of the existence of God (arguably the theological question) 
must unquestionably fall under the blow of the epoché.  That is not to say that God 
necessarily does not exist, but merely that the question of God’s existence is irrelevant to 
phenomenology: this may be termed methodological agnosticism.20  Husserl makes the claim 
          19 “As much as reduction, as much as Being” Michel Henry, “Quatre Principes de la Phenomenologie”, 
Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, Vol.96 No.1 (1991).
          20  This may be seen as a direct successor to Kant’s dismissal of any “proof of God’s existence” in the 
“Transcendental Dialectic” of The Critique of Pure Reason.  “To get out of the way all opposed assertions, 
whether they be atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic; all this is very easy to do in such a critical treatment, 
4explicit in his Ideas, writing, “Upon this 'absolute' and 'transcendent' we naturally extend the 
phenomenological reduction.  It [the transcendence of God] must remain excluded from the 
new field of study we have to create, insofar as this field must be a field of pure 
consciousness.”21  Initially, this claim appears incontrovertible, permanently closing the 
question of the relationship between phenomenology and theology.  But this question, like 
phenomenology itself, has experienced significant subsequent revisions and reinterpretations 
throughout the previous century, perhaps most importantly in the work of phenomenology's 
first son, Martin Heidegger.  
Before considering his mature work, it may be helpful to recognize that Heidegger’s 
relationship to theology is itself in no way static.  In his 1920-21 lectures on religion we find 
the bold assertion that “Only with phenomenological understanding, a new way for theology 
is opened up.”22  Yet, as we will see, following his development of Existential 
Phenomenology, most notably in Being and Time, this position is completely reversed.  
As we previously noted in our discussion of Heidegger's turn from Transcendental to 
Existential Phenomenology, perhaps the greatest contribution of Heidegger to 
phenomenology was the reintroduction of the question of “Being.”  As he describes his 
project, “Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of Being and to do so 
concretely.”23  If phenomenology is solely understood as a science of conscious acts—acts by 
which a transcendental subject constitutes objects—than the reintroduction of Being becomes 
fundamentally nonsensical.  Instead, what we see in Heidegger is an abandonment of the 
subject-object paradigm in toto.  Against this perspective is posited a holistic understanding 
since the same grounds for considering human reason incapable of asserting the existence of such a being, 
when laid before our eyes, also suffice to prove the unsuitability of all counter-assertions.” Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998): 588.
          21 Husserl, Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology, §58, as cited in Janicaud, Phenomenology and the 
“Theological Turn”: 68.
          22 Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press): 47.
          23 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, (New York: Harper & Row, 1951): 19.
5of the human individual denominated as Dasein, that being whose mode-of-Being is Being-
in-the-world.  In connection with this distinction, phenomenology is no longer understood as 
a science of conscious acts but instead, more broadly, as the study of experience.  In this way 
Heidegger retains the phenomenological preference for immanence over transcendence, but 
intimately ties these immanent experiences to the manifestation of Being.  Nonetheless, 
throughout all of these changes, Heidegger’s relationship to theology remains essentially that 
of Husserl.  Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in his notorious claim that “a Christian 
Philosophy is a square circle and a misunderstanding.”24  Yet, it must be recognized that, like 
Husserl before him, this comment is primarily methodological.  This position is clarified in 
his 1946 Letter on Humanism in which he refutes Jean-Paul Sartre’s assertion that 
existentialism is necessarily a correlate to atheism.  Against this view he writes:
“The thinking that points toward the truth of Being as what is to be thought 
has in no way decided in favor of theism.  It can be theistic as little as 
atheistic.  Not, however, because of an indifferent attitude, but out of respect 
for the boundaries that have been set for thinking as such.”25  
Likewise, in what may be his clearest demarcation of phenomenology and theology, he is 
quoted as stating, “If I were to write a theology (as I am sometimes minded to) then the word 
“Being” would not be found there.”26 27
          24 Martin Heidegger, “The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 8.
          25 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, (New York: HarperCollins, 1993): 254.
          26 Marion, God Without Being: Coverpage.
          27 It should be noted that these claims are further complicated by certain references found throughout his 
latter work: e.g. “only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought,” The precise role that 
the “holy” and the “sacred” play in his thought is in no way conclusive, but they seem to point to the 
fundamental ambiguity that encompasses religion throughout Heidegger’s thought, and perhaps 
phenomenology in general.  For reference, one possible interpretation of  Heidegger’s use of “Sacred” can 
be found in Jean-Yves Lacoste’s Experience and the Absolute, “We will say that in the field of experience 
the Geviert attempts to thematize, mortals become acquainted with an immanent sacred [deviennent  
familiers d’un sacré immanent], but not with a transcendent God.” Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute: 
18.
6§2
Before we can examine our second critique, that of the “phenomenology of the 
invisible,” it may be enlightening to briefly map out the trajectory of this notion in the history 
of French phenomenology.  The earliest formulation of this thought can be found in the 
existential phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty's The Phenomenology of Perception.  This text 
remains absolutely fundamental to an understanding of the subsequent development of 
French phenomenological thought.  In this work, Merleau-Ponty examines the priority of 
perception, a view which leads him to emphasize the importance of “embodiment” and the 
prevalence of invisibility in human experience.  To quote, “therefore the body is not an 
object.  For the same reason, my awareness of it is not a thought, that is to say, I cannot take 
it to pieces and reform it to make a clear idea.  Its unity is always implicit and vague.”28  In 
this sense, “invisibility” can be understood as intimately tied to objectification; that which 
cannot be rendered as an object (i.e. objectified) cannot appear.29  
This formulation recurs, without fail, throughout the entirety of the proceeding 
“theological turn.”  In Levinas we find the un-objectifiable “Other” [l'autre]; in Henry “Life,” 
the invisible essence of phenomenality; in Marion the “Saturated Phenomena”: the Flesh, the 
Idol, the Icon, the Event, and Revelation; and lastly in Lacoste, the non-event of “Liturgy.” 
What distinguishes these experiences (or in Lacoste's terminology “non-experiences”) from a 
fundamental lack is generally expressed through the distinction of intention and intuition, or 
in Kantian language concept and intuition.  Due to an absence of conceptuality or 
intentionality these experiences are incapable of manifesting as a phenomenon in the 
traditional sense—that is, within the horizon of visibility.  Nonetheless, these experiences are 
          28 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (New York: Routledge Classics, 2002): 231.
          29 "For example, I see the next-door house from a certain angle, but it would be seen differently from the 
right bank of the Seine, or from the inside, or again from an aeroplane: the house itself is none of these 
appearances: it is, as Leibnitz said, the geometrized projection of these perspectives and of all possible 
perspectives, that is, the perspectiveless position from which all can be derived, the house seen from 
nowhere.  But what do these words mean?  Is not to see always to see from somewhere? To say the house 
itself is seen from nowhere is surely to say that it is invisible!”, Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of  
Perception: 77.
7still “given” [gegeben],30 in the sense that intuitive, hyletic, or affective data are still present 
to the recipient.   
Although this discussion of the “phenomenology of the invisible [or unapparent]” 
may appear peripheral to our main purpose, Janicaud seems essentially accurate in his 
assertion that “on the contrary, it places us at the crux of the matter where everything is 
decided.”31  Only if it is permissible to talk of that which, by definition, cannot appear within 
the horizon of the world, can one even conceive of a phenomenological theology.  It is for 
this reason that in his work to distinguish phenomenology and theology, Janicaud seeks this 
subject as the primary target of his critique.  
Perhaps Janicaud's critique may best be summed up with his simple question, directed 
towards Levinas, “what remains of it, deprived of everything empirical?”32  For Janicaud, 
having abandoned phenomena in search of their foundation, the “theological turn” 33 has been 
“hijacked” by metaphysics.  In more technical terms, Radical Phenomenology seeks to 
outline the structures that ground experience.  In order to discover these structures, it must 
seek evidence outside (or beyond) the strict phenomenological horizon of visibility.  It is 
Janicaud's claim that any methodology which moves beyond this horizon (i.e. towards the 
invisible) is no longer capable of speaking of the “things themselves” and has therefore 
moved out of the realm of valid phenomenological research.  
This critique can similarly be found in Derrida, who in a discussion with Marion 
proclaims, “I am also for the suspension of the horizon, but, for that very reason, by saying 
so, I am not a phenomenologist anymore.”  Furthermore,  “ it is difficult for me to understand 
how to describe something not as an object; as something other than an object, and to claim 
          30 See. Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
          31 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the 'Theological Turn”: 31.
          32 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the 'Theological Turn”: 40.
          33 For the remainder of the paper, the “theological turn” and the “turn” will both refer to the group of 
phenomenologists whose work is noted for its heavy religious content.  This group includes (but is not 
limited to) Levinas, Henry, Chretien, Marion, and Lacoste.
8that we are still doing phenomenology... It is difficult for me to understand how an excess of 
intuition can be described phenomenologically.”34    What we can see here is a fundamental 
disagreement concerning the nature of phenomenology itself.  On the one hand, we find those 
for whom phenomenology's work is essentially tied to, or bound within, the horizon of 
visibility; any movement beyond this horizon, although potentially legitimate in its own 
right, does not bear the title “phenomenology.”  On the other hand, we find those who argue 
that phenomenology's content must include everything that appears, even those phenomena 
whose mode of appearing is never that of an object.  Before seeking an answer to this 
question, let us examine our final critique of phenomenological theology, one that comes 
from within the “turn” itself.  
§3
In our discussion of the previous two arguments directed against phenomenological 
theology, Marion has primarily been identified as a “proponent”; that is to say, his project 
was identified as one which shows the possibility of the adoption of phenomenological 
means toward theological ends.  As a matter of precision it must be recognized that this is 
principally an interpretation of Marion's project which he himself would not likely support. 
Quite to the contrary, Marion offers a clear example of our third critique.35  
This dichotomy is succinctly expressed in his essay Metaphysics and 
Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology where he writes:
“Its [revelation's] phenomenological analysis therefore bears only on its re-
presentation, its “essence,” and not directly on its being-given.  The intuitive 
realization of that being-given requires, more than phenomenological analysis, 
the real experience of its donation, which falls to revealed theology.  Between 
          34 Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, “On the Gift” in God the Gift and Postmodernism, 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999): 66, 77.
          35 It should be noted, even if only in passing, that certain of Marion's claims seem to support our thesis. 
In his discussion with Derrida (previously cited), he admits, “In that precise sense, the distinction between 
the field of philosophy and the field of theology, the “limits” between them in the meanings of Kant and 
Fichte, could be bridged to some extent.” Yet, it is clear from his writings that, on the whole, he holds 
philosophy (phenomenology) and theology to be essentially methodologically distinct.  Derrida and Marion, 
“On the Gift”: 39.
9phenomenology and theology, the border passes between revelation as 
possibility and revelation as historicity.  There could be no danger of 
confusion between these domains.”36  
This clear distinction between possibility and historicity (or in other instances “fact”) can be 
seen as operative in the background of Marion's entire œuvre.  Not only does he fear that the 
introduction of historicity into his work would necessitate its designation as theological, but 
furthermore, that if this were the case his work as a whole would be compromised.  He 
defends himself, writing, “I suggest that my proposal remains merely philosophical and 
without any theological presupposition or bias here.  On the contrary, any theological bias 
and second thought would ruin my project.”37  Even in his explicitly religious examples, he 
goes to great length to emphasize that these are merely examples and absolutely nothing 
more.38  
This position appears to find support in Husserl's early claims regarding 
phenomenology.  Of the phenomenological attitude he writes, “can we not attain an attitude 
of such a kind that the empirical, being the characteristic of the givenness of the natural 
attitude, remains completely disengaged, and indeed in such a way that also its essence as  
essence of nature remains disengaged.”39  Once again, our discussion hinges upon a 
particular interpretation of the role of the epoché.  This interpretation argues that, through the 
“bracketing” of transcendence, we should achieve a phenomenological neutrality. If the 
object as transcendent is bracketed, then likewise its historical existence, its very facticity, 
must be bracketed.  Therefore phenomenology, Marion argues, is primarily a study of the 
          36 Marion, “Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology”: 590.
          37 [emphasis my own] Derrida and Marion, “On the Gift”: 70.
          38 “If I therefore privilege the manifestation of Jesus Christ, as it is described in the New Testament (and 
in conformity with the paradigms of the theophanies of the Old), as an example of a phenomenon of 
revelation, I am nevertheless proceeding as a phenomenologist—describing a given phenomenological 
possibility—and as a philosopher—confronting the visible Christ with his possible conceptual role (as 
Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, or Schelling dared to do), with an eye toward establishing a paradigm.” Marion, 
Being Given: 236.
          39  Edmund Husserl, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, (Netherlands: Springer, 2006): 32.
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possibility that certain phenomena may appear and can in no instances refer to the actuality or 
historicity of phenomena.  Furthermore, it appears indisputable that theology necessarily 
refers to historicity, or at least actuality.  What form would a theology take if it refused to 
present itself as positing actuality?  Would it even be recognized as a valid theology?40
Having examined these three critiques, we can now see the great difficulty that exists 
for phenomenological theology.  Not only do these critiques arise from outside, but 
simultaneously from within the “turn.”  In order to establish itself as a possibility, it will 
therefore be necessary for phenomenological theology to seriously engage these refutations 
and deeply consider the nature of both phenomenology and theology.  
III. Theological and Phenomenological Responses
§1
Before we begin our refutation of these arguments it may be helpful to briefly 
recapitulate their basic structure.  First, we were presented with the argument that theology 
deals necessarily with the transcendent, while phenomenology purely with the immanent. 
Second, that theology deals with what is, by definition, invisible, while phenomenology with 
the appearance of phenomena.  Third, that theology works exclusively in the realm of 
actuality, while phenomenology's work is necessarily in terms of possibility.  From here our 
response will take the form of four distinct moves.  In the first three, these critiques will be 
examined and the strict dichotomies by which they are constructed will be questioned.  Once 
complete, the final portion of this analysis will examine the consequences of these three 
analyses, synthesizing them in order to show one possible form that a legitimate 
phenomenological theology might take.  
§2
It seems without question that the first critique of theology, developed by Husserl and 
Heidegger,41 possesses considerable strength.  Many traditional theological methods, 
          40  This possibility will be engaged below.
          41 It is also worth noting that, although it was not referenced to earlier, this argument can be found, 
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including at least Thomistic Scholasticism (Aristotalianism), would be rendered indefensible 
following the reduction to immanence.  Nonetheless, the question must be asked, does this 
necessarily limit all forms of theological inquiry? The clearest alternative to the 
transcendental theological disposition, and that which has gained considerable attention 
within phenomenology, is the so-called “mystical” theological tradition.  Among the major 
thinkers of the “theological turn,” mystical theologians have played an extremely prominent 
role.  In Michel Henry's Essence of Manifestation—following a critique of Heidegger, 
Husserl, Hegel, and Fichte42—Meister Eckhart is presented as a model by which the 
immanence of subjective life can be rightly understood.  Similarly, in Marion's In the Name: 
How to Avoid Speaking of Negative Theology Pseudo-Dionysius' Mystical Theology is 
proposed as a forerunner to Marion's conception of the “Saturated Phenomenon.”  Even more 
recently, in the preface to Experience and the Absolute, Lacoste pays homage to Juan de la 
Cruz, of whom he writes, “I chose to use their notions freely.”43  Yet, the question remains, 
from a methodological standpoint, what can be gleaned from mystical thought?
The unifying methodology of mystical theology is perhaps best expressed by the 
commonly cited slogan, Ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab interioribus ad superiora [From the 
exterior to the interior, from the interior to the superior].  In this method's traditional form, 
the mystic is instructed to progressively remove consciousness of the external world until 
only the internal life of the mind remains.  Once achieved, the wills and differentiations 
within the mind itself are similarly bracketed.  It is believed that once a mind has completely 
detached itself from all will, knowledge, and sensation that it is in a position to achieve 
likewise, in Janicaud.  Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”.
          42 Kant is similarly critiqued, in a portion of the manuscript that was edited out and later published 
separately as Destruction Ontologique de la Critique Kantienne du Paralogisme de la Psychologie 
Rationnelle.  
          43 This is perhaps the correct place to emphasize that it is obviously true that these thinkers also drew 
from both mystical and non-mystical sources, it is merely the preeminence of the mystical that is being 
noted. [e.g. “their” in this quote actually refers to both Juan de la Cruz and Bonhoeffer] Lacoste, Experience  
and the Absolute: 3.
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mystical union [unio mystica] with the Absolute.  Nowhere can this emphasis upon a retreat 
from the external to the internal be seen more clearly than in the work of Meister Eckhart. 
Commenting upon this duality, Eckhart writes, “all this Scripture calls the old, the earthly, the 
outer, the hostile or the slavish man. The other person in us is the inner man, which Scripture 
calls the new, the heavenly, the young, the noble man, or the friend.”44  This suppression of 
the external and elevation of the internal is found, not only in mystical anthropology, but 
perhaps more importantly in mystical theories of God.  Within traditional Neoplatonic 
thought, physical reality is conceived as the final act of creation (or emanation) and 
consequently, furthest removed from the source: God.  Yet, the soul, or at least a specific 
region of the soul, is understood as intimately tied to (or in certain instances identical to45) 
God.  In this sense, God is more accurately understood as radically interior than exterior; the 
radically immanent is united with the radically transcendent. As Marion writes: 
“Husserl submits what he names “God” to the reduction only insofar as he 
defines it by transcendence (and insofar as he compares this particular 
transcendence with that, in fact quite different, of the object in the natural 
attitude); and yet in Revelation and theo-logy, God is likewise, indeed 
especially characterized by radical immanence to consciousness, and in this 
sense, would be confirmed by the reduction.”46
Conceived in this sense, phenomenological theology could best be seen to follow the advice 
of Eckhart, who directs, "one should not accept or esteem God as being outside oneself, but 
as one's own and as what is within one."47
Our first critique, in which the content of phenomenology was posited as immanent 
and theology as transcendent, must therefore be recognized as a fundamental 
oversimplification.  Just as philosophy has evolved to include a plethora of immanent and 
          44 Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, (New York: Penguin Books, 2004): 99.
          45 e.g. Eckhart's "Little Spark".
          46 Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: 242.
          47 [emphasis our own] Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1981): 188.
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transcendent methodologies, so to has the complex history of theology.  Although one might 
challenge the content of such an immanent theology, and many have,48 these challenges must 
be made “theologically,” that is to say, the field itself cannot be dismissed outright; at least, it 
may not be dismissed on the grounds of the phenomenological epoché.  
§3
In our second critique, it was shown that theology must reckon with the invisible, 
while phenomenology deals exclusively with the visible (phenomena in the traditional sense). 
Yet, once again, it must be argued that such an absolute claim oversimplifies the complexity 
of the field; although in this instance, it is phenomenology and not theology which has been 
misrepresented.  Against this view, it will be shown that phenomenology has, since its 
founding, dealt with both visible and invisible phenomena.  
As a point of clarification, it should be reminded that invisibility in this context is 
directly related to objectification; an object is invisible to the extent that it is impossible for it 
to manifest as a determinate object.  Already we have seen this un-objectifiability played out 
in Merleau-Ponty's conception of the body.  Yet, there is no need to advance even as far as the 
French Existentialists to discover this position.  Recourse to the invisible can be identified 
even among the earliest phenomenologists, including, most notably, Heidegger.  
In his magnum opus Being and Time, Heidegger seeks to elaborate precisely what it 
means to be Dasein (the human individual), a being which is always already in a world.  In 
order for this analysis to even feign completion it is necessary that Heidegger explicate 
precisely what is meant by the term “world,” a task which he undertakes in §14-24, “The 
Worldhood of the World.”  It is here that we discover an oddity in Heidegger's thought, he 
writes, “And we have formally defined 'phenomenon' in the phenomenological sense as that 
which shows itself as Being and as a structure of Being.”49  This appears consistent with his 
          48 One need only examine the Bull “In agro Dominico” (1329), to find accusations of heresy directed 
towards these perspectives.
          49  [emphasis our own] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962): 
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earlier definition of phenomena as anything which “shows itself.”  Yet, it must be noted that, 
by including the “structures of Being,” Heidegger has concerned himself both with apparent 
phenomena and those phenomena which are essentially incapable of making such an 
appearance.  For, if beings (objects) are those entities which show themselves within the 
world, than necessarily the world-itself cannot, by definition, appear within this horizon.  Yet, 
the “world,” understood phenomenologically, cannot be understood as anything other than a 
structure of Being, i.e. a phenomenon.  It is clear that Heidegger feels the weight of this 
aporia, as he writes, “thus, to give a phenomenological description of the 'world' will mean to 
exhibit the Being of those entities which are present-at-hand within the world.”50  In order to 
understand that which by definition cannot appear, Heidegger finds that he must resort to an 
examination of that which can appear. In this sense, Heidegger's project bears a notable 
similarity to Kant's deductive project in the Critique of Pure Reason: the “structures of 
Being” are deduced purely from the relationships of entities manifest within these structures. 
In this sense, it may not be strictly necessary to argue that the “world” does not appear, but 
merely that it does not appear as an object, i.e., within the horizon of visibility which the 
world itself is.  Heidegger appears to recognize this fact and express a certain level of 
openness to the variety of means by which phenomena might manifest themselves including, 
theoretically, those whose only manifestation is outside of any horizon; that is, the invisible.  
In this way, we find ourselves in a position to affirm—with Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, and the thinkers of the “turn”—that the horizon of the world is not the full extent of 
phenomenality, and consequently, neither is the object the only mode in which beings might 
manifest themselves.  Of course, it is still possible that one might argue that phenomenology 
must deal exclusively with “objectifiable” beings, but in this instance the burden of proof 
seems to fall unequivocally upon the critic.  The historical manifestations of phenomenology 
have in nearly every case acknowledged the necessity of engaging with the “transcendental” 
91.
          50  Heidegger, Being and Time: 91.
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structures of consciousness (or Being), structures which cannot appear within the horizon, for 
they themselves precisely are this horizon.  In the same way, phenomenological theology 
must therefore be permitted to engage in such inquiry.  
§4
In regard to Marion's assertion of the incompatibility of phenomenology and theology, 
there appear to be two routes open by which we might offer a challenge.  On the one hand, 
we might cite recent theological work, perhaps exemplified in Richard Kearney's The God 
Who Might Be.  Here, theology has abandoned its safe-house of actuality and moved into the 
ambiguous landscape of possibility.  God is no longer conceived as a being (or non-being) 
that is in some sense “real,” but instead, as the mere eschatological possibility of itself.  In 
this way, Kearney has a shown a route by which theology might ground itself upon possibility 
and that it is, therefore, in no way decided that theology's field of inquiry must remain 
directly tied to historicity (i.e. actuality, facticity).  
Furthermore, if we examine Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology we find the repeated 
assertion that Christian theology is only possible in the co-presence of the “universal” 
(possibility) and “concrete” (actuality).  Positing Christ as the archetype of this simultaneity, 
Tillich writes, “In so far as he is absolutely concrete, the relation to him can be a completely 
existential concern.  In so far as he is absolutely universal, the relation to him includes 
potentially all possible relations and can, therefore, be unconditional and infinite.”51  Yet, 
such a concern for the union of the universal and the concrete is not the unique property of 
Tillich or even theology as a whole.  Instead, this concern is a direct product of the significant 
influence of Heidegger's Being and Time upon Tillich's theology.   
For Heidegger, the question of Being is plagued by its tendency to become either 
reduced to the most meaningless universality or contracted into an absolutely un-
generalizable particular.  It is for this reason that Heidegger seeks to ground every claim 
          51 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. I, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951): 17.
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regarding Being within a concrete entity.  “If we are to arrive at the basic concept of 'Being' 
and to outline the ontological conceptions which it requires and the variations which it 
necessarily undergoes, we need a clue which is concrete [konkret].”52  Here Heidegger 
appears to be responding to the question of Husserl, who writes, 
“But if we really record experience as experience, i.e., regard it as positing 
individual being, then, although we may be certain that the range of such 
positing is a very wide one, we cannot be so completely certain whether, on 
the basis of such experience, something like an experiential science, as a real 
matter-of-fact-science, can be founded.”53
In response to this concern, Heidegger appears to offer his Existential Phenomenology as a 
model by which one can perform work which is, on the one hand, methodologically (i.e. 
phenomenologically) legitimate, and on the other, directly connected to historical being.  For 
Existential Phenomenology, every phenomenon is a historical (factical) phenomenon.  To 
refuse to acknowledge this implicit historicality would be to return to the Transcendental 
Idealism of Husserl, an Idealism against which phenomenology has been in constant revolt 
since its earliest manifestations.54  
In light of this development, Marion's critique must be seen as an outdated, or at least 
minority, view.  To unilaterally declare that phenomenology deals only in possibility, against 
the consistent examples to the contrary throughout the history of phenomenology, seems to 
unnecessarily limit this field.  Similarly, as Kearney illustrates, theology need not be 
necessarily pigeonholed within pure actuality, but may be equally built upon the possibility 
and the fecundity of God.  In light of these two responses, we can see that the unambiguous 
relegation of theology to the historical and phenomenology to the possible betrays both 
studies.  Against this we will posit phenomenology, theology, and any convergence of the two 
          52 Heidegger, Being and Time: 63.
          53 Edmund Husserl, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, (Netherlands: Springer, 2006): 89.
          54 The earliest manifestation of the backlash against Husserl's “Transcendetal Turn” can be seen in the 
large number of students who abandoned Husserl after his publication of Ideen, as well as published 
responses by Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty (to name only a few).  
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as a study which is equally concerned with both the actual and the possible.  
In light of our preceding investigations, let us now attempt a synthesis of our 
conclusions by which we might generate a working model of a phenomenological theology. 
§5
  In his previously cited Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn” Janicaud writes, 
“We have not had any other design than to draw out these several traits and to recall an 
insurmountable difference: phenomenology and theology make two.”55  Against this 
assertion, we might draw up two objections.  First, phenomenology and theology do not 
make two, because each is not merely one.  Having engaged these three critiques, it has 
become clear that the fields of phenomenology and theology are fundamentally ambiguous. 
The sharp variance of opinion generated within these two domains leaves the claims of these 
critiques fundamentally untenable.  In each circumstance it was shown that, although the 
critique holds significant weight against a certain “style” of phenomenology or theology, it 
was in no way broad enough to encompass the fields in their entirety.  This leads to our 
second objection, phenomenology and theology are not two, because in certain circumstances 
they may be one.  If these two fields are truly as diverse and ambiguous as we have indicated, 
then there is no reason to presuppose the impossibility of their convergence.  It is this 
convergence that we have called phenomenological theology, and it is this convergence 
which will ground our proceeding investigation into the essence of parable.  
But, before we continue, it may be helpful to clearly delineate the form of our 
phenomenological-theological methodology. 
 1.) The field of study for phenomenological theology, like phenomenological 
philosophy, is immanence; perhaps even radical immanence.  
2.) Phenomenological theology is concerned with the multiplicity of manifestations of 
Being; both those within and without the horizon of the world, both the visible 
and the invisible.  
          55 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: 103.
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3.) Phenomenological theology is concerned with both the possible and the historical, 
the universal and the concrete.  
With these stipulations in mind, we can now see a path by which a phenomenological 
theology might remain true to its dual identity: both a rigorous phenomenology and a 
vigorous theology. It is by way of this path that we will conduct our investigation of the 
phenomenon of parable.  
Chapter 2
The Manifold Senses of Time in the Parable
I. Introduction
“Time must be brought to light—and genuinely conceived—
as the horizon for all understanding of Being
and for any way of interpreting it.”
-Heidegger56
A discussion of the phenomenon of parable's relationship to temporality may appear an 
unlikely direction for our investigation.  Moreover, it has been the explicit project among 
proponents of the value of parable to de-emphasize this relationship, emphasizing instead the 
universality, the “timeless” character of the parable.  While this perspective will be substantially 
addressed,57 a full abstraction from the questions of time and history is by no means in the interest 
of our discussion.  On the contrary, as time has played a major role throughout the development of 
continental philosophy and in particular phenomenology, a failure to address these questions would 
leave our discussion of this complex phenomenon severely inhibited.  As Heidegger writes, 
“Whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as 
its standpoint.”58  In this sense, time will function for us as a starting point, or perhaps more 
accurately as a foundation, for the remainder of our investigation. 
Furthermore, the question of time is of particular necessity within an investigation of the 
nature of parable—for the parable is a phenomenon whose temporal ambiguity resists any clear 
demarcation. On the one hand, the parable appears, first of all, as the product of a historical event. 
Like any text it must find itself situated in the larger complex of objective world-historical time. 
Yet, the parable also manifests temporal complexity, for as a narrative it inevitably constitutes an 
internal temporality.  Furthermore, as we have already noted, there is a definite sense 
          56 Heidegger, Being and Time: 39.
          57 Division 2, Part IV.
          58 Heidegger, Being and Time: 39.
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in which the parable appears to manifest itself as “timeless,” as the vehicle of universal truth. 
In light of these various senses of temporality—which remain in perpetual internal struggle, 
simultaneously defining the essence of parable and participating in its meaning—our 
discussion of time will take the form of three distinct movements.  First, we will begin with 
the temporality most easily recognized within the parable: the objective, the world-historical. 
Second, we will move to consider the way in which the parable, as a story, enacts the internal 
temporality of an “in that time...”  Lastly, we will engage that dimension of the parable which 
appears to transgress the strict bounds of temporality as it is normally construed: the universal 
or eternal nature of the parable.  
II. The Parable as Past
§1
As we have seen, our line of questioning cannot help but find itself in reference to 
temporality.  Nonetheless, for phenomenology, particularly in its existentialist manifestations, 
temporality has remained primarily future-oriented.  Perhaps due to Heidegger's emphasis 
upon projection, the question of time as past has remained consistently peripheral.  Yet, in the 
words of Friedrich Nietzsche, "The unhistorical and historical are necessary in equal measure 
for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture."59  We must therefore step 
backwards, recognizing that the parables as we now possess them were written at a concrete 
time, by a concrete individual, in a concrete context.  In short, proper parable interpretation 
necessitates historical criticism.  Nonetheless, what precisely is intended by “historical 
criticism” remains, as yet, unclarified.  
Hegel's historiography, epitomized in his infamous Phenomenology of Spirit, appears 
as an obvious choice of historical framework.  In this construal of history, we find history 
understood as essentially teleological: history as the movement and self-manifestation of 
          59 Fredrich Nietzsche, “The Use and Abuse of History for Life.” In Untimely Meditations. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 1997): 63.
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Geist.60  Within this movement, a clear progression of self-understanding can be traced, 
climaxing at Calvary,61 and resulting in the full revelation of the Absolute as Absolute  
Knowing.  Although a powerful and influential conception of historiography, this teleological 
understanding of history is not our aim, nor shall its dialectic be our method.  A brief 
consideration of the use of history will reveal that every historiography, Hegel's included, is 
designed for a specific purpose and in response to specific questions.  As an example, we 
might recognize individuals (e.g. politicians) who, often citing identical historical incidents, 
draw out dramatically differing understandings of the lessons which can be derived from this 
past.  That is to say, for any single historical event one can find countless interpretations, 
interpretations which might serve any number of distinct or even diametrically opposed 
purposes.  Returning to our question concerning Hegelian dialectics, we discover within 
Hegel's work an essentially constructive understanding of history.  Hegel's project remains 
fundamentally an attempt to express the means by which “reason is the law of the world and 
that, therefore, in world history, things have come about rationally.”62  This project appears as 
the epitome of metaphysical totalization, and therefore falls counter to the explicit project of 
existential phenomenology.  More specifically, we are not seeking to place the parable within 
the larger framework of the movement of history, if such a movement is even objectifiable. 
Instead, we are merely seeking a means of access by which we might better understand the 
existential conditions in which these texts were composed: our project is descriptive, not 
constructive.  
Following an explicitly phenomenological course, one might suppose that it should 
therefore be our intention to dispose of every hermeneutic lens, to view history in its purity, 
          60 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
          61 Jean-Yves Lacoste Experience and the Absolute. Perspectives in Continental Philosophy (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2004): 135-136.
          62 G. W. F. Hegel, Reason in History. Trans. Robert S. Hartman (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1953): 11.
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its neutrality.  For as Husserl emphasizes countless times, phenomenology, as exemplified in 
the epoché, is the elimination of naïveté: the attainment of a pure, presuppositionless 
perspective.  Yet, the possible attainment of this “pure perspective” appears to be mythical, a 
Kantian Ideal, forever deferred.  Furthermore, even if such a purity were possible, by what 
possible means would we be capable of identifying it?  It is for this reason that, instead of 
pursuing this “objective” purity, we will merely seek to clearly expose our methodological 
intentions as best as we are able.  
For phenomenology, the principal problematic is the question of access; how are we to 
gain access to the material which we might take as evidence? For Husserl, the repeatedly 
referenced epoché unambiguously provides this means-of-access.  Yet, this new “region of 
being”63 provides access to the conscious acts of the individual alone; that is to say, it is 
methodologically solipsistic.  Against this solipsistic tendency, what we seek is a means by 
which we might better understand the social-historical context in which the parables were 
constructed, as well as the psychological experience recorded therein.  Yet, it must be 
remembered that we are not merely performing phenomenology, but phenomenological 
theology.  In light of this fact it must be asked, is there a theological benefit to such an 
examination? Is it not possible that the parables can simply speak for themselves?  Given the 
common appraisal, that the content of the parables is universal (viz. intended to speak beyond 
the time and place of composition), this seems an entirely plausible possibility.  In order to 
avoid dismissing this perspective without due attention, let us turn to a work in which the 
distinction between the universal and the historical can be seen in its most exaggerated form: 
the theology of Michel Henry.  
§2
Although theological themes can be found throughout Michel Henry's work, his most 
extensive engagement with explicitly theological material can be found in I am the Truth:  
          63 Edmund Husserl, "Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy" in The Essential Husserl: Basic 
Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999): 66.
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Toward a Philosophy of Christianity.  The principal focus of this work is an explication of 
Life.  Dualistic in many important senses, one of Henry's principal distinctions falls between 
the “Truth of the World” and the “Truth According to Christianity.”  
Drawing upon Husserl's conception of time as described in his lectures on The 
Phenomenology of Time Consciousness, Derrida's philosophy of difference, and Heidegger's 
conception of “the world,” Henry explicitly conflates the horizon of visibility, the world, 
Time, history, consciousness, and language under an Inbegriff aller Vorstellungen: the Truth 
of the World.  Unlike the domain of Life (accessed by the Truth According to Christianity), 
this world is essentially the domain of death.  Here, objects are merely representations 
manifested to consciousness, always different from what they hope to represent.  These 
objects arrive to consciousness, but just as quickly fade into memory and nonbeing.  It is a 
world of uncertainty and ambiguity, forever beyond our grasp.  
Against this world, Henry posits the self-affectivity of Life as lived.  Here, one 
directly—that is, without mediation or distance—experiences the embrace of Life through 
such phenomena as joy, love, anxiety, pain, and pleasure: essentially, pathos in its most 
positive sense.  It is this domain which is engaged through the Truth According to 
Christianity, the Christian message in its most essential form.
In his emphasis upon the internal truth of Christianity, Henry appears to be invoking 
Christian mystical thought—in particular Meister Eckhart, who writes that “the inner eye of 
the soul is the one which perceives being and receives its own being directly from God.”64  In 
this thought, reality is internal and access to this truth requires the progressive abandonment 
of both the physical and willful attachments to multiplicity.  “There are three things that 
prevent us from hearing the eternal Word.  The first is corporeality, the second is multiplicity 
and the third is temporality.  If only we could transcend these three, we would dwell in 
          64 Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings (New York: Penguin Group, 1994): 171.
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eternity, in the Spirit, in unity and in the desert, and there we would hear the eternal Word.”65 
It takes no significant effort to identify the clear connection between this sentiment and 
Henry's truth of the world/Christianity dichotomy.66    
It is within this dichotomy that the repression of historicality reveals itself.  Having 
fully distinguished the world as it is understood historically from the truth of Christianity (i.e. 
theology), Henry is forced to propose theology as absolutely distinct from any historical or 
textual analysis.  Henry writes, “What the answer depends upon, the truth of Christianity, has 
precisely no relation whatsoever to the truth that arises from the analysis of texts or their 
historical study.”67  Furthermore, "It [the Truth According to Christianity] relates to a reality 
other than that of the text itself, in such a way that the reality targeted in this text is never 
posited through it."68  Here we find the previous assertion brought to bear in its fullest terms. 
Not only is theology absolutely unconcerned with history, but the very texts themselves are 
incapable of speaking to the truth of Christianity, a truth which is only possible through an 
examination of the immanence of the internal Life.  
Yet, does the trans/a-historical message of Christianity truly necessitate such a 
startlingly stark distinction? Even within the mystical sources from which Henry heavily 
borrows we do not find such an intense rejection of the biblical material as textual.  It is true 
that Meister Eckhart, in his commentary upon Genesis, clearly marks the distinction between 
worldly knowledge and mystical knowledge, that is, historical knowledge and eternal 
knowledge.  But, in the earlier portion of the work, The Commentary on the Book of Genesis, 
          65 [Emphasis our own] Eckhart, Selected Writings: 175.
          66 It should also be noted that this emphasis on the message of Christianity over and above the "world" 
should not be misunderstood as a uniquely mystical phenomenon.  Such a disposition can be equally found 
in the earliest Christian texts, for instance, "Therefore whoever wishes to be a friend of the world becomes 
an enemy of God." (James 4.4) and "Do not love the world, neither the things that are in the world.  If 
anyone loves the world, the Father's love is not in him." (1 John 2:15).
          67 Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Towards a Philosophy of Christianity, trans. Susan Emanuel (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003): 3.
          68 Henry, I am the Truth: 7.
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Eckhart engages in traditional exegetical work, carefully dissecting the text's surface reading 
in a common manner.  It is only after this work is complete that Eckhart understands himself 
to be in a position to begin The Book of the Parables of Genesis, his explicitly mystical 
analysis of the “internal meaning” of the text.  He describes this difference writing, “I do this 
to arouse the more skilled readers to seek a better and richer explanations of theological, 
natural and moral truths hidden beneath the form and surface of the literal sense.”69  In this 
methodology, Eckhart does not dismiss the value of a literary and historical analysis, fully 
enveloping it within his mystical thought.  Instead, he sees the mystical analysis as a 
furthering of the work already begun within the exegetical reading.  For Eckhart, the 
historical and the universal are both independently valuable, if for no reason more than that 
“the external face must be beautiful in order to attract.”70
In order to provide a reading of parable by which this phenomenon can be seen in its 
fullest clarity, it is therefore necessary for us to incorporate both the historical/critical reading 
of the text and an analysis of its universal content.  A failure to incorporate this concrete 
perspective would leave an analysis ungrounded, open to unbounded speculation.  In our 
attempt to provide such a historical grounding for our analysis we must turn, once again, to 
Heidegger. 
§3
The Heidegger with whom we seek kinship is not the later Heidegger for whom 
theology and phenomenology must remain fundamentally distinct.  Instead, we look to some 
of Heidegger's earliest work, a series of lectures concerning religion given in 1920-1921. 
Although still an assistant to Edmund Husserl, one can already sense the existential concerns 
that will later dominate his philosophy and sharply distinguish his work from Husserl's. 
Perhaps nowhere is this distinction more clearly marked than in his consistent recourse to 
          69 Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, trans. Edmund 
Colledge and Bernard McGinn.  The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1981): 92.
          70 Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense: 92.
26
history.  As we have already noted, within Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology, the role 
of historical analysis is ambiguous at best.  Yet, in these lectures we find the historical 
presented as fundamental to phenomenological work.  But, it must be asked, if the principal 
question of phenomenology concerns the means of access, what access is granted by 
historical consciousness?  
“The historical,” Heidegger argues,  “through the distancing from a particular, present, 
world-orienting standpoint, opens the eyes to other life-forms and cultural ages.”71  Heidegger 
appears to insist that, although phenomenology must in all circumstances remain the study of 
experience, it need not remain solipsistic, even methodologically.  Instead, through the 
analysis of historical texts, we gain access to phenomena spatially and temporally beyond the 
initial grasp of our life-world.  Moreover, Heidegger insists that not only is this access a 
possibility, but that it is a necessity for theological research.  “Characteristic of the 
phenomenological-religious understanding is gaining an advance understanding for an 
original way of access.  One must work the religious-historical method into it, and indeed in 
such a way that one examines it critically.”72  It must be emphasized that although this 
historical analysis is in no way phenomenology proper, it nevertheless sets the stage for 
phenomenological research.  As Heidegger writes, it is done “already from out of 
phenomenological motives.”73  
Once this historical analysis is completed, one is in the position to “empathize” with 
the historical character.  That is not to say that one ever achieves a position within which one 
might be fully subsumed into a historical situation: we can never truly walk in another's 
shoes.74  But simply that, just as we possess the capacity to experience the emotional or 
          71 Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, tran. Mattias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna 
Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004): 26.
          72 [Emphasis our own] Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life: 47.
          73 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life: 58
.
          74 For a fuller treatment of this critique see Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life: 61-63.
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intentional states of those with whom we interact at present (spatial distance), we can 
similarly enact such empathic interaction across historical (temporal) distance.  Heidegger 
provides a clear example of this project in his analysis of Paul's letters.  Narrating this 
transition from historical analysis to empathic (phenomenological) analysis he writes, “Now 
we no longer observe the object-historical complex, but rather see the situation such that we 
write the letter along with Paul.  We perform the letter-writing, or its dictation, with him.”75  
Such an approach is in no way foreign to the tradition of parable interpretation. 
Historically, parable interpretation has fallen primarily into two camps: the diachronic and the 
synchronic approach.  The latter, epitomized in 20th century structuralism, argues that the 
meaning of a parabolic text can be extracted from the “deep structure” of the material.  This 
approach is fundamentally a-historical and perhaps more congruent with Henry's notion of 
theology as absolutely distinct from the temporal/historical world.  The former, diachronic 
method emphasizes the interconnection between meaning and historical context.  
“The meaning of a parabolic text is mediated by an extra-linguistic, socio-
historical matrix to which the textual subject matter belongs and to which the 
subject matter mimetically or analogically points. By reading the parabolic text 
diachronically, according to the unfolding of the story-line, this historical 
orientation contends that the logic of the narrative plot will put one in tune with 
the meaning called forth by the extra-linguistic context."76
It is through the recognition of this matrix—in its multifaceted manifestations: social, 
historical, economic, religious, cultural, etc.—that we can attain the necessary foreconception 
by which we can interpret the internal narrative of the material.  We must therefore turn to 
this internal narrative where we will find the parables second mode of temporality, the 
parable as present.
          75 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life: 61.
          76 Theodore J. Weeden, "Recovering the Parabolic Intent in the Parable of the Sower" Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion, Vol. 47, No. 1, Thematic Issue: NewTestament Interpretation from a Process 
Perspective (Mar., 1979): 106.
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III. The Parable as Present
§1
"Well, perhaps we ought to make use of this fiction a little more, 
if we are going to clear up the question at issue satisfactorily."
-Plato77
 
Regarding the question of “deep structure” within mythology, Paul Ricoeur writes, 
"First of all, the myth is a form of narration: it recounts the events of the beginning and the 
end inside a fundamental time – "In those times..." This referential time adds a new 
dimension to the historicity which charges the symbolic meaning and so must be treated as a 
specific problem."78  Such a concern is equally applicable to an analysis of parable, and it is 
precisely this “In those times...” that will be the focus of our next movement.  
Theological material can be transmitted by any number of means—treatise, song, 
visual art, poetry, etc.  Yet, the parable nonetheless appears uniquely positioned, a medium in 
which “timeless” truth is offered within a strictly narrative form.  What Ricoeur seems to 
identify in the preceding passage is the necessity of engaging this dimension of historicity, 
the necessity of treating the dramatic within myth, or in our case, within parable.  If the 
narrative form is understood as an essential component of the parable, just as the myth, then a 
failure to treat it as such would be to misconstrue the meaning of the text itself.  That is to 
say, the narrative format of the parable is an irreducible element of its essence.  
It might be tempting to follow traditional parabolic interpretive techniques which seek 
a direct allegorical meaning within the text.  This allegorical hermeneutic remained the 
undisputed method of interpretation throughout Christian history, even as early as the Gospel  
according to Mark.79  But such an interpretation diminishes the necessity of internal 
          77 Plato, "Laws" in Complete Works ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1997): 713a.
          78 Paul Ricoeur, "Structure and Hermeneutics" in The Conflict of Interpretations (Evanston: 
Northwestern Unversity Press, 1974): 28.
          79 e.g. Mark 4.10-20.
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temporality: the text need no longer take the form of a story but might be just as easily 
rendered by a collection of determinate facts.  The question must therefore be asked; is there 
something unique to narrative that cannot be expressed through static text?  If the answer to 
this question is “no,” then what role has parable in the work of theology and religion?  Is it 
merely aesthetic or didactic, a beautiful, though inessential method of transmitting religious 
doctrine?
This appears to be precisely the role that has been granted to parable by traditional 
interpretive methods.  Within this hermeneutic the parable of the “Good Samaritan,” for 
example, is nothing more than the commandment “love thy neighbor.” Yet, if our previous 
assertion is correct, such a translation of the parabolic content into “mere fact” may be 
essentially untenable.  Perhaps instead there is a fundamental instability within the parable 
which must be experienced as a “becoming.”  Perhaps the parable can only be understood 
when it has been vicariously or empathically lived by a reader, a reader who is drawn into the 
story as a child. Understood in this sense, the parable appears to bear a closer affinity to 
drama and literature than to rationalistic theological doctrine.  And perhaps rightly so, as 
Nietzsche writes:
"If the value of a drama lay solely in its conclusion, the drama itself would be 
merely the most wearisome and indirect way possible of reaching this goal... but 
that its value will be seen in its taking of a familiar, perhaps commonplace 
theme, an everyday melody, and composing inspired variations on it, enhancing 
it, elevating it to a comprehensive symbol, and thus disclosing in the original 
theme a whole world of profundity, power and beauty."80
§2
Nietzsche's analogy provides a powerful insight into the structure of the parable.  The 
subject of the parable appears, initially at least, to be the mundane, the “familiar, perhaps 
commonplace theme.”  It may be this single fact, more than any other, which distinguishes 
the myth and the parable.  Whether the creation of the world in the carcass of a great beast, 
          80 Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History for Life: 92-93.
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the heroic tales of a demi-god, or the perilous journey home from Troy, myths are essentially 
otherworldly.  Within the battles of gods and time-before-time, we find characters who, 
although they may resemble everyday humanity in many important aspects, nonetheless live 
outside of the world of common experience.  These figures reside in their own reality, what 
Schelling calls the “world of the gods.”81  This distance speaks volumes, for myths are 
ambitious.  They explain the natural order: they tell us why the sun rises, why the just suffer, 
and the nature of eternity.  Through their grandeur they allow the individual to experience the 
divine, the dramatically transcendent.  In comparison, the parable appears almost pathetically 
humble.  It speaks of common themes and of mundane life.  We find no demi-gods, only 
farmers; no great abysses, only dusty roads.  Yet, this is precisely the strength of the parabolic 
narrative.  Unlike the great myths, it takes no significant work to empathize with these tales 
and their familiar characters.  It is not necessary to explain the distress of a mugging victim, 
of a disappointed father.  In most parables, this empathy arises naturally.  We intuitively 
recognize the implied context of the narrative whether it be social, economic, political, or 
natural.
Nonetheless, not all parabolic circumstances are so clear.  Like any narrative of 
interest, parabolic stories are riddled with aesthetically minor, though interpretively essential, 
details.  Not simply arbitrary facts, in many instances an understanding of these historical 
particulars fundamentally rewrites the stories in which they are found.  For one who is 
unfamiliar with the cultural context of 1st century Judea, the rescue of a Jew by a Samaritan 
may seem in itself insubstantial.  Yet, if one recognizes the deeply rooted social, cultural, and 
ethnic stigma separating these Jewish and Samarian neighbors, the radical nature of this story 
becomes undeniable.  It is in this sense that our previous concern, historical criticism, is 
essentially and indisputably tied to an understanding of parable as narrative.  To assert, as 
Henry has, that the theological message can be uncritically abstracted from its social-
          81 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of  
Mythology: 9.
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historical context, is to fall victim to one’s un-reflective hermeneutic. Although it is true that 
the content of parables is drawn from the mundane world, it is not drawn from our mundane 
world.  Just as Heidegger is unable to interpret Paul's letter to the Galatians without first 
recognizing the existing conflict between the Jewish and Greek Christians,82 we cannot 
expect to follow the unfolding parabolic narratives without a prior basis in historical analysis. 
This emphasis upon historicity, it might be argued, implies that the parable is nothing 
more than a bit of nostalgia, a quaint story of a time gone by.  The parable appears to be a 
snapshot, uncritically representing its contextual location.  Yet, from the structure of the 
parable itself we find a rebuttal.  In the words of Robert Funk, “Distortions of everydayness, 
exaggerated realism, distended concreteness, incompatible elements—often subtly drawn—
are what prohibit the parable from coming to rest in the literal sense; yet these very factors 
call attention to the literal all the more.”83  It is the servant with a comically large debt,84 the 
shepherd abandoning his flock,85 which alert us to the fact that the world represented in these 
stories is a “ruptured”86 world, subtly surreal, as a Vonnegut novel or a Greenaway film.
§3
"Therefore, his diary is not historically accurate or strictly narrative;
it is not indicative but subjunctive."
-Kierkegaard87  
Just as Kierkegaard's Seducer's Diary, the parabolic texts are not historical narratives, 
they do not tell us what did happen; nor are they myths, telling us why things are as they are. 
          82 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life: 48.
          83 Robert W. Funk, "The Parable as Metaphor" in Funk on Parables: Collected Essays (Santa Rosa: 
Polebridge Press, 2006): 48.
          84 Matthew 18.25-35.
          85 Matthew 18.10-14.
          86 Funk, "The Parable as Metaphor": 48.
          87 Søren Kierkegaard, "Seducer's Diary" in Either/or (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988): 
304.
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Instead they possess and embody an amorphous “maybe,” so elegantly described by 
Kierkegaard in the previous quote.  It is this quality—the subjunctive, that which might be—
which is suffused within the parabolic text and expressed through exaggeration, comedy, and 
subtle surrealism.  
In this sense, the parable forms an internal dialectic. On the one hand, we find the 
parable marked by humble realism, and on the other by surrealistic exaggeration and other-
worldliness.  It is precisely this tension which motivated the existential interpretation of 
parable which arose in the middle of the 20th century.  This thought—popularized by Funk, 
Perrin, et al.—emphasizes this tension, this “rupture,” as the essential moment of the parable. 
Funk describes this moment as a fracture in which the one can peer “through” the everyday 
world and glimpse something other, yet “strangely familiar.”88  
"One experiences existential disclosure in hearing/reading a text at the point at 
which continuity is ruptured by discontinuity.  This rupture usually occurs at the 
point at which the hearer/reader, having been invited to participate in one world 
of a story, a world familiar to him/her, is suddenly challenged by the possibility 
of a radically different world—a world he/she must affirm or deny."89
It is this “radically different world” which forms the true content of the parable. 
Furthermore, it is the nature of this content—the presentation of a world—which necessitates 
its formulation as a narrative.  Contrary to Wittgenstein's claim that “the world is a totality of 
facts,”90 the world is equally a world of inexpressible experienced content—e.g. the 
affectivity of emotions, artwork, the other, and all that we have designated as the 
“invisible.”91  It is for this reason that the parable must be empathically lived by its audience, 
and it is for this reason that it cannot be reduced to a series of non-metaphorical, de-
          88 Funk, "Parable as Metaphor": 48.
          89 Weeden, "Recovering the Parabolic intent in the Parable of the Sower.": 107.
          90 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractus Logico-Philosophicus (United States: CreateSpace, 2011), 5.
          91 Jean-Luc Marion presents a theory of this unexpressibility as "Saturated Phenomena" in his Being 
Given.  This theory is derived from the earlier work of Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry, in which the 
totality of phenomena are divided into those which are objectifiable and those which are not.  
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allegorized terms.  
Yet, in order to fully defend this thesis, we must clarify precisely what is meant by 
“world” in this context, a clarification which we will substantially pursue in later sections 
[Division 3].  First, we must anticipate this discussion with the presentation of our third 
mode-of-temporality, the parable as universal.  Here we will establish the precise topology 
within which the remainder of our discussion will be located.  
IV. The Parable as Eternal
§1
"I call 'the suprahistorical' the powers which lead the eye away
from becoming towards that which bestows upon existence the
character of the eternal and stable, towards art and religion."
-Nietzsche92
In our previous analyses we have found the parable, and its interpretation, inescapably 
tied to temporality.  As a composition, it is developed within a definite point in the 
temporality of history.  Furthermore, as a narrative, it operates within its own time, drawing 
the reader forward in the movement of the “In that time...,” enveloping its audience within an 
internal temporality.  Although analysis of these temporalities provides invaluable assistance 
in the interpretation of parable, it remains unclear whether these temporalities exhaust the 
meaning of the parabolic text.  If we might speak more strongly, it seems that an analysis of 
the parable's relationship to time, past and present, fails to engage the location in which the 
parable primarily finds its meaning.  In this sense, our proceeding investigations, although 
essential to proper interpretation, remain essentially propaedeutic.  Yet, if we are to boldly 
claim that the essential meaning of the parable has not been exposed in its historical 
composition nor in its narrative structure, then we must uncover an alternate location in 
which such content might be identified—we must discover the topology in which the parable 
finds its meaning.  
          92 Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History for Life: 120
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In order to determine this content and its topology, it may be helpful to begin by 
asking ourselves the simple question, “to whom is the parable written?”  For certainly, 
engaging our previously defended historical-critical method, we should be able to identify a 
rough outline of its audience: what language they spoke, when and where they lived, their 
familiarity with the Jewish scriptures and Greek philosophy.  Yet, if these historical peoples 
fully encompass the audience of the parable, then for what reason are these texts still read? 
Surely a modern embrace of the parable text transgresses the proper limits of history, 
applying texts which are by definition “other than our own” to undoubtedly modern 
problems.  We are in no way citizens of the 1st century Mediterranean world, nor the 
shepherds and peasants for whom these texts were initially created and to whom they were 
transmitted.  This is not to say we must abstain from all inquiry into historical documents, but 
merely that such research seems the appropriate domain of classical studies, the sole property 
of historians and philologists.  Yet, within church pews, from the pulpit, and among 
theologians we find these parables taught, preached, and proclaimed as truth, and moreover, 
as universal truth.
It is possible that we might merely end our discussion here, declaring such use 
“strictly anachronistic?”  We might simply dismiss the parable as an outdated form, and the 
particular parables of Jesus as traces of a temporally and physically distant world.  Yet, is it 
possible that those who identify a universal meaning within parablolic texts are not, strictly 
speaking, wrong?  Certainly we must be clear that all historical texts offer a meaning to the 
present, but this meaning is as a historical text.  What we are seeking to clarify is the extent 
to which the parable, as a “universal text,” not only speaks beyond its explicit context, but 
speaks across all temporalities including our own. As Perrin writes: 
“In the message of Jesus there is a very real tension between the Kingdom as 
present and the Kingdom as future, between the power of God as known in the 
present and the power of God to be known in the future”... The question to be 
raised, however, is not whether this consensus is correct, but rather whether it is 
legitimate to think of Jesus' use of the Kingdom of God in terms of “present” and 
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“future” at all.”93
Here, it seems, we are on the verge of contradicting ourselves.  For, earlier we noted 
that we would be engaging three distinct modes of temporality: the past, the present, and the 
eternal.  Yet, is it possible to speak of an eternal, a universal, which is not identical to the a-
temporal?  Are we not, through recourse to the universal, abandoning our strictly temporal 
project?  It is precisely this ambiguity which saturates our subject: the eternal.  In order to 
clarify this issue, we must examine two distinct understandings of the eternal.  
The status of this concept—the eternal, the universal—has remained a constant source 
of tension, reinterpretation, and paradox throughout the Western theological and 
philosophical tradition.  Perhaps its earliest extensive treatment can be found in The Poem of  
Parmenides.  Here Parmenides develops his strict ontological monism, arguing that there is 
but one existent being, that is, Being-itself.  Having divorced Being from any possibility of 
change, growth, or development, he writes, “it [Being] is immovable in the bonds of mighty 
chains, without beginning and without end; since coming into being and passing away have 
been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away.”94  This understanding of the universal, 
as that which stands in contradistinction to temporality, is pervasive in ancient thought. 
Drawing upon this Parmenidean conception, Plato developed a similar a-temporal 
interpretation of the universal.  
““Therefore it is necessary, as it seems, that each thing that is in time and 
partakes of time be the same age as itself and, at the same time, come to be both 
older and younger than itself.”—“It looks that way.”—“But the one surely had 
no share of any of that.”—“No, it didn't.”—“Therefore, it has no share of time, 
nor is it in any time.””95  
This clear demarcation between the universal and temporality has remained a standard 
          93 Norman Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and Metaphor in New Testament  
Interpretation. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980): 40.
          94 Parmenides, Early Greek Philosophy ed. John Burnet (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1892): 175.
          95 Plato, "Parmenides" in Complete Works ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997): 141d.
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feature of metaphysics beyond Ancient Greece and into the 20th century through such 
influential thinkers as Husserl.96  Against this perspective there remains a minority view, 
perhaps most clearly epitomized by Eckhart's conception of the Now-moment.  
As is the case with the majority of his most important concepts, the precise 
understanding of Eckhart's “Now,” or Now-moment, is thoroughly ambiguous.  As Eckhart 
speaks primarily through imagery and metaphor, our first step will entail establishing a 
relative relationship between his terminology.  We must first identify a coincidence between 
the terms “Now,” “God's Day,” and “Eternity.”97  Establishing a dichotomy, Eckhart opposes 
these terms to a second concept generally designated as “the Soul's day” or “time.” On the 
one hand, it might be easy to conflate this dichotomy with the classical Parmenidean 
position; for Eckhart appears to retain the primary distinction: eternity vs. time.98 
Nonetheless, a close reading of the associated passages reveals an essential complexity in 
Eckhart's thought.  Eckhart repeatedly insists upon a direct relationship between temporality 
and eternity writing, “all time is contained in the present Now-moment,” “God's day, 
however, is the complete day, comprising both day and night,” and “time that has been past 
for a thousand years is as present and near to God as the time that now is.”99  What appears to 
underlie Eckhart's “Now” is not an eternity forever separate from temporality, but instead 
eternity as an inclusive concept, enveloping and containing all time within itself.  Here in the 
Now-moment, past, present, and future are united in an absolute identity.  Just as in 
Kierkegaard's “moment,” eternity has broken into and participated in the essence of time 
itself.  
          96 Particularly in his theories of Universals and Essences, developed in his Logical Investigations and 
Ideas.  
          97 Meister Eckhart, "Get beyond time!" in The Essential Writings trans. Raymond B. Blankey (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1941): 212-217.
          98 As he writes: "it all happens beyond time, in the day of Eternity." Eckhart, "Get beyond time!": 212.
          99 Eckhart, "Get beyond time!": 212-214.
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Furthermore, Eckhart identifies the eternity of the Now-moment as the singular 
location of creation, “God created the world and everything in it in the one present Now.”100 
In this sense, not only does the Now function as the totality of time, but perhaps more 
importantly, as the source or genesis of time.  If we are to take Eckhart's conception of 
eternity and universality as our model, then we are no longer forced to set ourselves “against 
time.”  Instead, we are left to seek out a “beyond” to time, a τοπος in which all modalities of 
temporality are absorbed and united—we must perform our work within the source of time 
itself.   
§2
The true extent to which our investigation is bound to temporality has now been fully 
exposed.  Not only are the historic and narrative temporalities of parable unavoidable aspects 
of interpretation, but we can now clearly see that, in order to uncover the most important 
contents of the parable, we must recognize its connection to the essence of temporality itself, 
what Eckhart calls the Now-moment.  But what particularly is this Now-moment? 
As early as 18th Century German Idealism, continental theories of temporality have 
been essentially tied to the structure of the I.  In the celebrated “Transcendental Aesthetic” of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts to explicate the two pure intuitions: Space and 
Time.  Noting the inability of one to abstract from these intuitions, Kant posits these two 
structures as a priori components of the structure of consciousness itself.  Furthermore, 
although he begins his discussion of these two with an analysis of Space, it is Time which 
takes clear priority.  For, although Space reigns over all that is external, “All representations, 
whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the 
mind themselves belong to the inner state [i.e. Time].”101   In light of the radical inclusivity of 
          100 Eckhart, "Get beyond time!": 214.
          101 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 163.
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Time, Kant immediately dissolves any clear distinction between the I (the cogito) and 
temporality, denoting Time as “inner sense” and positing it as the means by which “the mind 
intuits itself.”102  
Almost at its inception, this perspective can be found within phenomenology.  In 1928 
Husserl published The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.  This work opens 
with the fundamental differentiation of “objective time” and “time-consciousness,” that is, 
“clock-time” and the subjective experience of temporality.  As transcendent, objective time is 
necessarily bracketed from phenomenological investigation by the epoché, instead the 
individual experience of (immanent) time alone is analyzed.  What arises from this analysis is 
the constitutive power of temporality; that is to say, it is only to the extent that one exists 
temporally that one may constitute objects, particularly objects comprising a whole of parts; 
“everything which includes the comparison of several elements and expresses the relation 
between them – can be conceived only as a product of a temporally comprehensive act of 
cognition.”103  The mind, as that within which cognitions are manifest, is therefore intimately 
tied to its own temporality, and it is only as temporal that anything resembling a conscious 
mind could possibly exist.  
Heavily influenced by the preceding lectures,104 Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in 
Being and Time further solidified this tradition.  He writes, “in analysing the historicality of 
Dasein we shall try to show that this entity is not 'temporal' because it 'stands in history', but 
that, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the 
very basis of its Being.”105  Here, we once again find the absolute inseparability of the I and 
          102 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 157.
          103 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1964), 40.
          104 And, notably, their editor.
          105 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962), 428.
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temporality.  The I is not temporal merely because it has been dropped (factically) into an 
existing time-stream, because it participates in objective time, but because the very structure 
of its Being106 is such that it exists as constantly projecting itself into its own future. 
Furthermore, like Husserl, Heidegger understands time to function as a constitutive structure, 
as the “horizon of Being.”  It is therefore only to the extent that Being is manifest within the 
temporality of Dasein that it can bear “meaning”: not “meaning” in a conceptual sense, but in 
the primordial relationship that exists between Dasein and all beings.  
If we are to follow this continental tradition, then we must recognize that our topology 
cannot be found outside of the individual, but is in fact the very internal structure by which 
every object of thought, every traditional experience, is constituted.  Yet, in common 
language, as well as in the phenomenological tradition, there is a second name by which this 
constitutive structure is designated, a second name for “that 'wherein' a factical Dasein as 
such is said to 'live',” that is, the world.  As Michel Henry argues, “It so happens that this 
self-externalization of the externality where the horizon of visibility of the world is formed, 
its “outside,” has another name that we know still better: it is called time.  Time and the  
world are identical: they designate that single process in which the “outside” is constantly 
self-externalized.”107  
§3
Just as with our earlier investigation of the narrative element of parable, we have once 
again found ourselves driven towards this connection between parable and world.  Earlier, we 
asserted that the parable opens itself as a “radically different world,” distinct from the so-
called “world of everydayness;” we argued that this world forms the true content of the 
parable, or perhaps more accurately, the parable appears to take the form of this world.  As 
          106 The care structure.  
          107 [Emphasis our own.] Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Towards a Philosophy of Christianity trans. 
Susan Emanuel (Stanford: Stanford University Press): 17.
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Funk writes, “The parable communicates in a non-ordinary sense because the knowledge 
involved in the parable is pre-conceptual: it is knowledge of unsegmented reality, of a 
undifferentiated nexus, of a seamless world.”108  Yet, as we have seen, if it is our intention to 
examine the sense in which the parable is eternal (that is, universal), then we must examine 
its role within the phenomenon of conscious life itself.  In order to examine the non-historic 
nature of parable, the sense in which it transcends any particular individual and concerns 
itself to all individuals, then it appears a fundamental necessity that we move our discussion 
beyond the merely historical and engage the common internal structures of all persons, the 
structures of the “I.”  
Nevertheless, before we can examine the precise relationship which bears between 
parable and world we must undertake the promised, and as of yet unfulfilled, task of 
clarifying the phenomenological conception of the world.  Towards this purpose we will 
spend the following section examining the development of this concept within the founders 
of phenomenology, Husserl and Heidegger, as well as its further development in French 
phenomenology.  
          108 Funk, "The Good Samaritan as Metaphor": 86.
Chapter 3
The World, the Parable, and Restructuring
I: Introduction
Throughout our discussion, the term “world” has recurred repeatedly and in a variety 
of contexts.  Yet, world, as a concept, bears a significant quantity of philosophical baggage. 
World is a term which finds itself easily situated in a philosophical debate, a scientific 
journal, a historical study, a theological discussion, or common (i.e. non-technical) language. 
In light of this sheer diversity of use, it is essential that the precise concept borne by this term 
be clarified; for, in no way can it be presumed, or moreover it seems quite impossible, that 
these varied fields intend a single, interchangeable meaning.  Without delimiting our specific 
use of “world,” we will be unable to avoid equivocating about this particularly fecund term.  
In certain instances, the difference between distinct usages of world is easily 
identifiable.  When a historian discusses the “Roman world” or the “1st century world,” it can 
be unproblematically inferred that the focus of this discussion is fully distinct from the use of 
this term by an astrophysicist.  Yet, in many—if not most—uses of world, there remains a 
fundamental, and generally unrecognized, ambiguity.  When the author of The First Epistle of  
John commands “Do not love the world [κοσμος] or the things in the world,”109 does this 
usage correlate to the spatial-physical world of physics, the epochal/geographical world of 
the historian, or does it maintain its own distinct usage?  In light of this significant difficulty, 
we will not be served by an attempt at a comprehensive development of each individual 
meaning.  Instead, we will attempt to focus our attention upon a clarification of the way in 
which this term has developed within phenomenology.  It is this understanding of world 
which will provide a significant touchstone for our analysis of parable.
          109 NRSV 1 John 2.15.
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II. The Phenomenological World
§ 1
The earliest explicitly phenomenological engagement with the concept of world can 
be found in Husserl's 1910-1913 period, which we earlier designated as his “transcendental 
turn.”110  Seeking to develop a precise methodology for his burgeoning phenomenology, the 
most important product of this period is undoubtedly Husserl's distinction between the 
“natural attitude” and the “phenomenological attitude.”  Already, we have extensively 
discussed Husserl's epoché, the reduction by which all transcendent Being is “bracketed.” 
Through this reduction, Husserl believed that one could attain a phenomenological purity in 
which the contents of investigation would be ““necessary,” absolutely indubitable.”111  That is 
to say, even if the object found before oneself were not “really” there (e.g. in hallucination), 
one can remain absolutely certain that the “conscious experience” of the object is 
phenomenologically valid.  
Nonetheless, Husserl does not believe that one “lives” within this phenomenologically 
pure realm: this is explicitly and intentionally a philosophical attitude, separate from the 
world of everyday experience.  On the contrary, it is within the non-philosophical “natural 
attitude” that we necessarily find ourselves “at all times, and without ever being able to alter 
the fact.”112  
Throughout Husserl's description of the natural attitude we find a precise description, 
even perhaps (ironically) a precise phenomenology, of what he terms the “world.”  In Ideas I 
he writes: 
“I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming 
and having endlessly become in time.  I am conscious of it: that signifies, above 
all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience it.  By my seeing, 
touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of sensuous 
perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution or other are 
          110 The period during which he published his Lectures on Internal Time-Consciousness, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, and Ideas I. 
          111 Husserl, "The Basic Approach of Phenomenology": 79.
          112  Ibid.: 61.
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simply there for me, “on hand” in the literal or the figurative sense.”113
Already, the phenomenological concept of the world has begun to bear the specific 
descriptive traits by which later phenomenologists will seek to define and clarify this reality. 
The world appears spatially infinite, pulling away at all sides; the world is inherently 
temporal, a perpetual and unavoidable “flux” in which objects arise without warning and fade 
into the oblivion of memory; the world is defined by its sensuality, it is a “felt” world.  This 
final point is of particular importance, for it distinguishes the phenomenological concept of 
the world from the positivistic conception primarily employed by the natural sciences. 
Specifically, the world is not merely a location of physical “things”: energy, matter, and so 
forth.  But, as Husserl writes, “moreover, this world is there for me not only as a world of 
mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of 
goods, a practical world.”114  This is to say that, in the phenomenological world, the 
experience of a table, a fear, a number, or an artwork all appear with equal validity, necessity, 
and indubitability.    
It is this practicality, the importance of the individual human project, which grounds 
Heidegger's “existential” turn from Husserl.  Unlike Husserl, who provided an invaluable 
description of the phenomenal world but sought to overcome it through his epoché, 
Heidegger elevates this concept as a principal constituent of his phenomenological project in 
Being and Time. In his attempt to articulate a precise conception of the “worldhood of the 
world,” Heidegger articulates the following description: ““World” can be understood in 
another ontical sense—not, however, as those entities within-the-world, but rather as that 
'wherein' a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'. 'World' has here a pre-ontological 
existentiell signification.”115  It is precisely this notion of world, as that “wherein” one is said 
          113  Ibid.: 60.
          114  Ibid.: 61.
          115  Heidegger, Being and Time, 93.
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to “live,” which is of fundamental concern for us.  For, the direction of phenomenology is 
always toward practical life, toward a description and analysis of life as lived.  It is precisely 
this directionality that differentiates phenomenology from the natural sciences.  For, there is, 
as Husserl writes, “a sharp cleavage between the universal but mythico-practical attitude and 
the “theoretical”[attitude].”116  
This understanding of the world is further developed within the French 
phenomenological tradition.  In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty repeatedly 
attempts to defend his thesis that, “because we are in the world, we are condemned to 
meaning.”117  In a certain sense, this is merely a repetition of Husserl's earliest claim 
regarding the world, that it is “a world of objects with value.”  The sounds I perceive are not 
merely vibrations of air, but music; the gun in my sight is not merely an abstract sensation of 
silver, but (in the hands of an other) something to be feared.  
Nonetheless, this designation of the world—as that wherein one lives, as the horizon 
of life itself—leaves us with a significant and unanswered question, articulated most clearly 
in Being and Time.  “World,” Heidegger states, “may stand for the 'public' we-world, or one's 
'own' closest (domestic) environment.”118  In what sense are we to speak of the 
phenomenological world? In what sense can it be understood as subjective, as objective, as 
individual, or as communal?  Let us turn here turn to this essential question of subjectivity.  
§ 2
For those who are awake there is a single, 
common universe, whereas in sleep each person 
turns away into [one's] own, private [universe].
-Heraclitus119
          116  Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man" in Phenomenology and the Crisis of  
Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965): 171.
          117  Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception: xxii.
          118  Heidegger, Being and Time: 93.
          119  [Gender altered in implied language, viz. "his" rendered as "one's"] Heraclitus, Fragments: A Text  
and Translation with a Commentary by T.M. Robinson (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1987): 
Fragment 
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For Heraclitus, as for the Greeks in general, the commonality of the world was an 
unchallenged fact.  Heraclitus' formulation να κα  κοιν ν κόσμον ἕ ὶ ὸ [a single common world] 
perfectly captures the underlying Greek cosmology, what we will call mono-cosmism.  This 
conception is not relegated solely to the ancient world, but remains the norm throughout the 
majority of pre-modern, Western thought.  Yet, even in Heraclitus, we find the διονἴ  κόσμον 
[one's own world], an individual and subjective world.  Certainly, the context of this claim 
must be recognized; for Heraclitus, the subjective world [ διονἴ  κόσμον] was the world of 
dreams and of sleep, an inescapably unreal world.  This correlation—subjective=unreal, 
objective=real—remains the implicit principle underlying the standard critiques of 
phenomenology and its predecessor, idealism.  Yet, it is precisely this underlying assumption 
which is challenged by Kant, the German Idealists (particularly Fichte), and phenomenology.
Husserl's challenge to this position takes the form of an imperative (voire d'un cri)120, 
“zu der Sachen selbst!” [to the things themselves!], which Henry designates as one of the 
four founding principles of phenomenology.  Against the standard position that subjectivity is 
unreal or in some substantial sense less real, phenomenology argues for the absolute 
legitimacy of the subjective experience as a source of knowledge.  In his “principle of 
principles,” Husserl writes, “that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source 
of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us 
in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the 
limits in which it is presented there.”121  In this sense, phenomenology inverts the traditional 
epistemological presupposition; phenomena are not longer subject to ontology, but on the 
contrary, ontology is subject to phenomenology.  “It is only to the extent that appearing 
          120  Michel Henry, “Quatre principes de la phénoménologie,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale Vol. 
96 No. 1 (1991): 3.
          121  Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological  
Philosophy — First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten. (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1982): 44.
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appears and for this reason that being “is,” it is because appearing deploys its reign that being 
also deploys its own.”122  This complex relationship between ontology and phenomenology 
will be more substantially revisited at a later point [Chapter 3, Section IV].
Through phenomenology's resistance to the traditional hierarchy—of ontology over 
phenomenology—the subjective world need no longer find itself critiqued as lacking rigor, or 
as essentially unreal.  On the contrary, the subjective world is elevated as the principal 
modality in which philosophical and theological truth may present itself.  This is evidenced 
by Husserl's  epoché, by the priority of the Dasein analytic in Being and Time, and by Henry's 
recourse to the radical subjectivity of pathetic123 life.  
Yet, here, it must be recognized that the concept of the subjective world has becoming 
thoroughly enmeshed with Husserl's concept of the “horizon of visibility.”  Whereas for 
Husserl the world remains a posited transcendence, wholly distinct from the horizon of 
visibility—that is, the horizon by which the I receives intuitive data—throughout the further 
development of phenomenological thought these two terms become fully interchangeable, to 
the point of absolute identity.  This convergence can be identified as early as Heidegger, but 
is fully consolidated in later thought where we read, “the world is not the set of things, of 
beings, but the horizon of light where things show themselves in their quality as 
phenomena.”124  It is through this equivalence of the horizon of visibility and the world that 
our question can be brought to a close.  The phenomenological conception of the world, like 
Husserl's horizon, is essentially and necessarily a subjective world.  
In light of this elevation of subjective phenomena above the supposed objectivity of 
traditional ontology, the topology of phenomenology must remain bound to this subjective 
world.  In this sense, phenomenology remains fundamentally solipsistic—not in the common, 
          122  (My translation) Henry, “Quatre principes de la phénoménologie,”: 4.
          123  As Davidson and Emanuel, Henry's pathétique is rendered as "pathetic."  This notion is connected to 
the Greek pathos, and should not be understood in the common, derogatory english sense. 
          124 Michel Henry, I am the Truth: 14.
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derogatory sense,  but instead as Heidegger writes: 
“This existential 'solipsism' is so far from the displacement of putting a isolated 
subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an 
extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world 
as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world.”125
Before we are able to reincorporate our findings into our larger phenomenology of parable, 
there is a final question regarding the nature of the world which must be examined. 
Particularly, what precise relationship does the world, as horizon, bear upon the objects found 
therein?
§ 3
"What must we suppose it to be? 
This above all: it is a receptacle of all becoming—
its wetnurse, as it were."
-Plato126
Throughout our analysis, we have primarily relied upon a Heideggerian conception of 
the world: the world as that “wherein” one can be said to live.  On the one hand, this analysis 
seems fundamentally accurate, revealing the nature of the world in some significant sense. 
Nonetheless, if we are to make a more careful analysis of the world, we might recognize that 
the role of the world in the generation of phenomena is more complex than this strict 
“wherein” may imply.  
Throughout his later thought, Heidegger develops the concept of the Lichtung, the 
“clearing.”127  Examining this concept, which primarily seems to function as a correlate or 
development of the world, we might position ourselves to clarify and critique this 
Heideggerian perspective.  In The Origin of the Work of Art, and in a voice more reminiscent 
of Boehme than Husserl, Heidegger writes:
“And yet—beyond beings, not away from them but before them, there is still 
          125 Heidegger, Being and Time: 233.
          126 Plato, “Timaeus” in Complete Works, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997):49a.
          127  It is important to note the root "licht," light, within "lichtung."  This clearing is a void, a space of 
light in which beings, phenomena, can recieve their light, that is, can appear.  
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something else that happens.  In the midst of beings as a whole an open place 
occurs.  There is a clearing.  Thought of in reference to beings, this clearing is 
more in being than are beings.  This open center is therefore not surrounded by 
beings; rather, the clearing center itself encircles all that is, as does the nothing, 
which we scarcely know.  Beings can be as beings only if they stand within and 
stand out [ek-sist] within what is cleared in this clearing.”128
The world, here construed as a clearing, retains its principal function as a “wherein.” 
Although more intimately tied to Being than individual beings, this clearing nevertheless 
appears fully passive in regards to those beings which arise or reveal themselves within it. 
Such passivity is an essential feature of the “late” Heideggerian human, one whose primary 
function is “letting beings be.”129  This passivity arises out of Heidegger's distinct concern 
that the world is regularly and systematically falsified by the positivism and mathematization 
of “technological thinking.”  Against this, Heidegger argues for a “meditative thinking,” an 
openness to the multiplicity and unpredictability of Being.   Yet, is there not a sense in which 
the positing of the world (the clearing) as absolutely passive, might be misleading or at least 
incomplete?
Following Robert Funk, we explicitly reject this reductive claim.  Instead, it must be 
recognized that “worlds enter into and shape one's experience of reality.”130  The world is not 
merely the passive, Heideggerian “wherein,” but, on the contrary, the world functions as an 
active constituent of reality itself.  Citing Ray Hart, Funk writes, “it is the shift in horizons 
that prompts one to “perceive a cow as so many pounds of beef rather than as something to 
be worshiped.””131 By this, Funk has identified a key aspect of the essence of the world: that 
is, its function as the center-point of a relationship.  Specifically, the world, this nexus of 
relationality, is precisely that place through which subject meets object, Dasein meets beings. 
          128  Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art" in Basic Writings ed. David Farrell Krell (New 
York: HaperCollins Press, 1977): 178.
          129  Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth" in Basic Writings ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
HaperCollins Press, 1977): 125.
          130 Funk, “Saying and Seeing”: 200.
          131 Robert Funk, "The Leaven" in Funk on Parables: Collected Essays (Santa Rosa: Polebridge Press, 
2006): 106.
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Yet, understanding the world as the nexus of relationality, it is easy to fall back into 
the “Heideggerian clearing.”  It is easy to return to a notion of world in which the world is a 
fundamentally passive link between the individual and the objects or beings with which it 
interacts.  But it must be reemphasized: the world, understood as nexus, is not merely a 
passive concept.  
As an analogy, let us consider the artistic composition.  In the creation of a work of 
art, one must choose his/her medium with the utmost particularity.  The perception of a 
composition, arranged on a canvas, framed, and placed in a museum is absolutely different 
from the same composition spray painted upon the side of a building.  The exaggeration of 
this essential difference has become an explicit concern and project across 20th century art. 
Andy Warhol re-deposits the mundane images of daily life within the gallery; the British 
street artist Banksy paints and plasters urban centers across the Western world with his 
provocative art, simply stating “This'll look nice when its framed [sic].”132  Yet, stepping 
aside from these particularly extreme examples, this difference can be recognized even 
among seemingly subtle changes of medium.  Performed on a viola, a piece written for violin 
bears an indisputable change in quality; for the audiophile, no digital file, regardless of 
quality, can compare to the “pure” experience of vinyl.  In light of these phenomena, it must 
be recognized that the artistic medium is not passive, but instead functions as a radically 
active ingredient of the artistic experience.
Analogically, the world functions as a horizon within which conscious experiences 
are composed.  Just as the framed canvas of an artistic composition is simultaneously that 
wherein a work is composed and an essential determining factor of the composition itself, the 
world is not only that wherein one lives (although it is precisely this), but is furthermore an 
essential determining factor of the experiences of life.  The world is not merely a clearing in 
which phenomena might be said to appear, but moreover bears the implicit responsibility of 
          132 Quotation drawn from an  untitled "Banksy" work, San Fransisco 2010.  
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determining the precise manner by which phenomena may appear.  This conception of the 
world can therefore be designated as a constructive world.  
At this point, let us attempt an integration of this theory of the constructive world 
with our previous analysis of the parable as world-presenting.  Specifically, it is now our task 
to expose the precise meaning of our earlier assertion regarding the parable, that the content 
of the parable is not an individual object, state-of-affairs, or being, but instead, the totality of 
a world itself.
III. The Parable as World-Presentation
§ 1
Already [Division 2], we have begun the process of analyzing the content of the 
parable as the offering of a “world.”  Particularly, we have examined the way in which the 
composer of the parable makes use of surrealism, hyperbole, and misdirection in order to 
present a world that is simultaneously both familiar and decidedly other.  At that time, our 
investigation stalled in the face of an ambiguity, specifically, the ambiguity regarding the 
term “world.”  Having worked through the treatment of this term throughout the history of 
phenomenology, we have now distinguished the phenomenological concept of the world 
from its conceptual counterparts.  Building upon this concept of the world—as the subjective 
environment both wherein and by which an individual experiences objective phenomena—
we are now in a position to clarify precisely what it means to present a world as content, 
what existentialist interpreters intend by the claim that the parable permits one “a glimpse of 
another world.”133
§2
To assert that the parable allows one to glimpse a world is, in a phenomenological 
sense, to grant that the parable allows one to see nothing.  Nothing, here, is not intended in 
the derogatory sense, as one might argue that a hallucination “shows nothing,” but in the 
          133 Funk, "The Parable as Metaphor": 48.
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sense given to nothing by Heidegger, and later brought to the forefront within French 
Existentialism.  Here, nothing might better be rendered as no-thing, that is to say, the parable 
manifests as a phenomenon whose content is no particular, unified, or distinct object.  This 
notion of nothing is captured by Heidegger who, describing anxiety, writes, “in that in the 
face of which one has anxiety, the 'It is nothing and nowhere' becomes manifest.  The 
obstinacy of the “nothing and nowhere within-the-world” means as a phenomenon that the 
world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety.”134 
What we find in this no-thing is precisely that realm of phenomena which we earlier 
designated under the title of “invisible”—that region of Being which appears within the 
context of experienced life, yet evades any attempted objectification or unambiguous 
determination.  Such an indeterminacy seems unavoidable within the context of the world for 
the simple fact that it is only “within” the world that objects as such can be constituted. 
Once again, this is not to say one cannot experience a phenomenon that is manifested outside 
of the horizon of the world, but merely that such a phenomenon is not experienced as an 
object.  
Nonetheless, even if such a region of phenomenality is granted, it is still unclear in 
what specific sense the parable can be understood to present no-thing.  For certainly parables 
speak of determinate objects and peoples; this farmer, that roadway, this sheep, that seed.  In 
what meaningful sense can a “mustard seed,” for instance, be possibly understood as 
phenomenologically indeterminate?  
In response to this, we must ask: is the mustard seed the true content of the parable? 
More generally, that is to ask: does the mere presentation of these determinate realities 
(objects, people, places, etc.) exhaust the meaning of the parable.  To this we must respond, 
unambiguously, that it is not the case.  This is not to maintain a sort of “hermeneutic 
gnosticism” by which we fully abandon the flesh of the text in exchange for a deeper esoteric 
          134 Heidegger, Being and Time: 231.
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meaning—to do so would be to fall into the anti-historic bias of Henry against which we 
earlier argued.  Instead, we must propose a more nuanced possibility: that the meaning does 
not reside within these individual objects because it resides solely within the relationship/s 
determined between them.  Just as a melody resides neither in its individual notes nor in the 
totality of these notes; nor a poem, within the collected words therein; the content of a 
parable, its essence, lies solely in the relationship that exists between its respective elements. 
It is because these relationships are explicitly contradictory to the “pre-parabolic-
world,” the world of the listener or reader, that the parable manifests as ruptured, surreal, or 
in the most basic sense different. In a parable, the audience is approached by world that is 
composed of familiar elements—locations, people, and objects—yet the relationship between 
these elements is distorted in compromising ways, ways which shake the very core of the 
elements themselves.  A Samaritan and a Jew come into contact on a road, a familiar scene 
composed of expected characters.  But the relationship between them is manifestly distinct 
from the expectations of the audience.  On the one hand, one might merely examine the 
content of specific objective acts: the Samaritan carries the Jew, the Samaritan pays for his 
health, the Samaritan promises to return.  Yet this analysis does not break into the truly 
revolutionary core of the parabolic structure.  The parable does not simply express actions 
devoid of meaning.  Read in light of its implicit message, the “Parable of the Good 
Samaritan” has been misnamed.  The Samaritan's actions toward the Jew are not merely 
“good”; he is not simply acting out of the overflow of his heart.  The Samaritan's very 
relationship to the Jew—and implicitly the relationship between human beings in general—
has been radically rewritten.  An absolute, and seemingly unquestioned, responsibility is 
expressed through the acts of the Samaritan.  It is therefore this distinction—between 
elements and relationships—that allows us to hold the seemingly paradoxical claim that the 
parabolic world is simultaneously foreign and familiar, everyday and radically reconstructed. 
As Funk writes, "metaphor seeks to rupture the grip of tradition on one's apprehension of the 
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world in order to permit a glimpse of another world, which is not really different but a 
strangely familiar world."135  
§3
In The Parable as Metaphor, Funk seeks to articulate the totality of the parabolic 
content, writing, “the “field” which the parable thus conjures up is not merely this or that 
isolated piece of earthiness, but the very tissue of reality, the nexus of relations, which 
constitutes the arena of human existence where life is won or lost.”136  Already, we have 
recognized the primacy of relationality in the phenomenological conception of the world: the 
world is precisely that middle term, binding the individual to beings or objects.  If, as we 
have just argued, the parable presents recognizable elements bound together in unanticipated 
relationships, then at last we might clarify precisely what is understood by the claim of 
existential/phenomenological interpretation which has recurred explicitly and implicitly 
throughout our investigation: specifically, the claim that the parable “presents a world.”
As the nexus of relationality, the world itself is neither a being (in the traditional 
sense), nor all beings as a totality, but is a completely distinct phenomenon governing 
relation.  To “present” such a world, one must therefore do more than simply present 
individual objects, one must attempt to uncover the essence of their relations to one another. 
It is precisely this revelation of relationality which we have designated as the central and 
essential content of the parabolic act.  
Yet, the reconstitution of a single relation is hardly capable of overturning the world-
of-everydayness.  The term “nexus” hints at the complex nature of the world as such; the 
world is not merely a single distinct relationship, but an inconceivably elaborate web of 
interacting and interpenetrating relationships.  It is for this reason that parables are seldom 
found in isolation.  A world cannot merely be given in a single blow, offered in its totality 
through a “perfect parable.”  Instead, like a historian who seeks to uncover a distant 
          135 Funk, “The Parable as Metaphor”: 48.
          136 Funk, “The Parable as Metaphor”: 46.
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civilization, the world of the parable must be assembled slowly, piece by piece.  
In order to analyze this creation let us turn to the parables of Jesus and their referent, 
“The kingdom of God,” as a case-study.
§4
“The kingdom of God is not coming with things that can be observed; 
nor will they say, 'Look, here it is!' or 'There it is!'  
For, in fact, the kingdom of God is within you.”
-Jesus137
Before we begin this examination, we should engage a few particular questions or 
problems which arise from the choice to engage these texts.  First, it must be recognized that 
there is a serious risk of limitation involved with the explicit use of the Biblical parables, and 
with Jesus' image of the kingdom of God.  Specifically, although our engagement is self-
consciously theological, it is not intended to be restricted to a merely “Christian” theology. 
The analysis of parable that is found in this text, if its work has succeeded, should be equally 
applicable to a variety of parabolic authors; not simply those of Jesus, but likewise, all 
parables composed within and beyond the plethora of traditions mentioned at the opening of 
this investigation should be touched by this analysis.  
Furthermore, we should note that there is insufficient space to properly examine the 
concept of the kingdom of God [  βασιλεία το  θεοἡ ῦ ῦ].  This concept has Jewish roots that 
considerably predate Jesus' use of the term, and a considerable quantity of discussion and 
debate has surrounded its proper interpretation and understanding.  As a point of full 
disclosure it should be recognized that, for the purposes of this investigation, this concept 
shall be understood as immanent138 in the tradition of “realized eschatology” and that 
subsequently the eschatological, apocalyptic, or teleological understandings of this term will 
          137 Luke 17.21 NRSV (with altered rendition of εντος as “within”).
          138 Drawing upon John Dominic Crossan, who distinguishes three models of the kingdom.  The 
traditional apocalyptic perspective of first century Judaism, the imminent perspective of John the Baptist, 
and the present (immanent) perspective of Jesus.  John Dominic Crossan, “The Kingdom of God” in The 




Lastly, we should note that the term “kingdom of heaven” will also be found in the 
ensuing discussion.  There does not appear to be any substantial difference between these two 
terms within the context of the Biblical texts, and for this reason they shall be treated as 
essentially interchangeable. With these various concerns in mind, let us now begin our 
analysis proper.  
According to all extant sources, throughout his ministry, Jesus repeatedly invokes the 
concept of the kingdom of God.  Particularly relevant to our discussion, a large section of 
parables found in the Gospel According to Matthew begin with the repeated refrain, “The 
Kingdom of Heaven is like...”139  In light of this fact, and the overwhelming presence of 
“kingdom” language throughout Jesus' ministry, Weeden writes, "the ultimate extra-linguistic 
referent of all of Jesus' Parables, whether explicitly stated or not, is the kingdom of God."140 
While this position is not univocally accepted, substantial work, particularly Perrin's Jesus  
and the Language of the Kingdom strongly supports this thesis.  Jesus, therefore, stands out 
from among authors of parable by his explicit naming of the reality implied by his parables.  
In light of our preceding discussion, we must now recognize that if this kingdom 
represents the parabolic content, then the kingdom of God must itself be a world in the 
phenomenological sense, a nexus of relationships.  As Funk writes, "The parables and 
aphorisms of Jesus constitute a fantasy: the creation of a secondary world called the kingdom 
of God, which is the good news or truth about the then regnant primary world."141  For Jesus, 
the kingdom of God stands in contrast to the everyday world of his contemporaries.  At his 
trial before Pilate he is famously quoted as stating, “My Kingdom is not from this world.”142 
World, here a translation of the Greek κοσμος, may perhaps be more accurately rendered as 
          139 Matthew 13, NRSV.
          140 Weeden, “Recovering the Parabolic Intent in the Parable of the Sower”: 97-120.
          141 Robert Funk, “From Parable to Gospel” in Funk on Parables: Collected Essays (Santa Rosa: 
Polebridge Press, 2006): 158.
          142 John 18.36 NRSV.
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world-order.  This κοσμος, like the phenomenological world, does not merely indicate a 
physical world, but the entire present fabric of reality: physical, political, economic, and 
inter-subjective.  Yet, if Jesus asserts that his kingdom is not from/of this world, then in what 
sense can we assert the immanence of the kingdom?  How can we simultaneously uphold 
Jesus' claims that the kingdom both “is not from this world” and “has come to you?”143  
What we must recognize is that the distance separating the kingdom of God and the 
world is not a temporal distance.  Rather, the attribution of temporal presence to both the 
κοσμος and the kingdom necessitates the recognition that these terms are intended as 
simultaneous realities.  The language of the kingdom does indicate a radically different time, 
a future posited beyond the present epoch, but a reexamination and reconfiguration of present 
reality.  
"Jesus appropriated the term from his Jewish heritage where "kingdom of God" 
historically drew its meaning from the ancient myths: the myth of God as creator 
of the world and the myth of God as Lord of history. But... he departs from his 
contemporaries, particularly the apocalypticists, in disassociating the kingdom 
from any historical or cosmological objectification."144
The kingdom remains saturated with the facts of present life: one still labors, buys, and sells; 
the fields continue to grow.   For, as Nietzsche writes, “The “kingdom of God” is nothing that 
one expects; it has no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it will not come in “a thousand 
years”—it is an experience of the heart; it is everywhere, it is nowhere.”145  For Jesus, the 
kingdom of God is here, if only we would see it.
Nonetheless, a vast chasm still separates the κοσμος and the kingdom of God.  This 
difference provides the meaningful ground by which the kingdom can be discussed and 
affirmed.  This affirmation, rendered in the biblical text by the concept of faith (πιστις), 
amounts to nothing less than the radical reconstitution of the world-order itself.  If, as we 
          143 John 18.36 and Luke 11.20 NRSV.
          144 Perrin, “ Recovering the Parabolic Intent in the Parable of the Sower”: 113.
          145 Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Antichrist" in The Portable Nietzsche trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: 
Penguin Publishing, 1954): 608.
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have already indicated, the κοσμος designates the world-order in its totality, then the 
rejection of this reality for another parallel reality, the kingdom of God, must result in 
nothing less then a reconfiguration that drives to the core of reality, that is, relationality-itself. 
In the words of Funk, "to those who participated in God's imperial rule, however, the world 
took a new shape, its objects hung together in a new way, and the things themselves were 
transformed as by a miracle."146  
In this, our principal problematic has revealed itself.  It might even be fair to say that 
our manifold and divergent investigations, although seemingly disjointed, have all brought us 
toward a clarification of this single point: a precise understanding of the way in which 
beings, “the things themselves,” can be transformed, radically reconfigured by the parabolic 
experience.  
The possibility of such a transformation underlies the tradition of the 
existential/phenomenological interpretation of parable. Yet, the precise nature of this notion 
has evaded explicit analysis.  An attempt at an explication of this phenomenon can be found 
in Funk's Saying and Seeing: Phenomenology of Language and the New Testament.  Yet, the 
explicitly linguistic bent of this project reduces its scope and subsequently its impact. 
Reinterpreting the nexus of reality (relationality) as a merely “linguistic nexus,” the radical 
reconfiguration enacted within the parabolic event—glimpsed by Funk's other work, 
particularly Parable as Metaphor—is neutered, seemingly reduced to an interpretive act.  Yet 
the explicit command of phenomenology, the return “to the things themselves” [zu den 
Sachen selbst!], necessitates a further analysis, an examination of the very reality proposed 
by such a phenomenon.  In essence, we must examine the ontological consequences of the 
parable.  Let us therefore turn to this final investigation.  
IV. Ontological Restructuring
"But they interpreted the same fact differently and made
the same happening visible to themselves in different ways.
          146 Robert Funk, "The Leaven": 107.
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Indeed, what appeared for them as the essential fact
and truth was something quite different."
-Heidegger147
§1
In the parabolic experience, the parable brings an alternate world into focus, 
challenging one to reorient oneself accordingly.  The individual experiences what Lacoste 
might designate a “redistribution of the field of experience.”148  This redistribution or 
reorientation of objects within the world, even if understood as nothing more than an 
interpretive gesture, nevertheless enacts an undeniable phenomenological change.  The 
mode-of-appearing of objects within the world does not remain static.  On the contrary, one 
experiences a fundamental ambiguity at the core of phenomenality: an ambiguity which 
permits objects to be experienced in radically distinct manifestations.  
As an example, let us take one of Heidegger's favorite models of phenomenality, 
drawn from the everyday world of work.  In the course of my everyday life I find something 
needing repair, perhaps within my house, that requires a hammer.  I enter my basement, 
searching extensively until the appropriate tool can be located. Having discovered the 
hammer, I commence the repair, finishing in short time.  Having completed the repair, I 
briefly pause to examine the hammer in my hand.  
Even in an example as trivial as that presented above, the radical ambiguity of 
phenomenality can be easily detected.  Specifically, the mode-of-appearing of the hammer 
does not remain fixed, but instead is experienced as two distinct reorientations of 
phenomenality.  The first appearance of the hammer itself, in this example, is the hammer as  
found.  In this instance, the hammer is not experienced within the specific confines of its 
“intended use,” that is, the hammer is not a tool oriented towards an end.  Instead, the 
hammer is itself the end, the objectified goal of a search.  In Heideggerian language, the 
          147 Martin Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics” in Basic Writings ed. David 
Farrell Krell (New York: HaperCollins Press, 1977): 290.
          148 Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute: 199.
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hammer is present-to-hand; although more specifically, it's presence is experienced as a 
whole; it is the hammer in its totality that is sought and found.
Thereafter, the hammer appears to fall out of focus: it no longer stands out of the 
horizon.  The hammer's mode-of-appearing has shifted, it now appears as a tool.  To once 
again borrow Heidegger's language, the hammer is now experienced as ready-to-hand: that 
specific phenomenality of the tool (means) towards an end.  Phenomenologically, the 
experience of the ready-to-hand is as closely related to non-appearing as it is to appearing. 
For, in the act of hammering, the focal point of the horizon has shifted from the hammer to 
nail, or perhaps more generally, from the hammer and nail to the project to be completed, the 
repair to be made.  In this sense, the hammer itself appears to fall outside of explicit focus; it 
achieves a sort of phenomenological transparency.  
Lastly, our example ends with a final reorientation.  The project is completed and the 
hammer is examined as a physical object.  Here, the hammer may once again be understood 
as present-to-hand. Nonetheless, although present-to-hand, its phenomenality is not identical 
to the hammer as found.  The hammer as a physical object is experienced, essentially, as a 
whole of parts: its wooden handle, iron head, leather grip.  In this sense, the hammer 
manifests as a conceivable object in the traditional sense, we might “take it to pieces and 
reform it to make a clear idea;”149 it is what the theoretical disciplines intend by “object.”  
It is precisely this ambiguity at the core of phenomenality, the manifold 
manifestations that phenomena might take, which is utilized by composers of parable.  What 
they recognize, even if only implicitly, is an instability underlying the world, the potential for 
a revolution or reorientation of phenomena.  When Jesus preaches his parable of the “unjust 
steward,”150 he does not merely teach the ascetic abandonment of “earthly riches,” but offers 
the possibility of a reorientation towards material wealth as such.  He proposes to the 
          149 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception: 231.
          150 Luke 16.1-13.
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listener/reader the possibility that material wealth need not necessarily be experienced 
through the everyday framework of the world-order, but instead, that one might bear a 
decisively unique relationship of releasement towards it. 
While the phenomenology of such a reorientation may be granted, is it possible that 
this change could be understood as an ontological restructuring?  That is to say, is a change in 
mode-of-appearing necessarily correlative to a change in Being?  Historically at least, the 
answer to this question appears to be negative.  In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel 
Kant provides for an absolute distinction between phenomena and noumena ( the things-in-
themselves), writing: 
“If, therefore, we wanted to apply the categories to objects that are not 
considered as appearances, then we would have to ground them on an intuition 
other than the sensible one, and then the object would be a noumenon in a 
positive sense.  Now since such an intuition, namely intellectual intuition, lies 
absolutely outside our faculty of cognition, the use of the categories can by no 
means reach outside our faculty of cognition.”151
What Kant articulates in this passage is an absolute cognitive distance separating the subject 
from noumena.  The I has access to phenomena alone and can only, through abstraction, infer 
the noumena: the thing-in-itself [ding an sich].  The being or the noumenon, is fundamentally 
unknowable.  The unbridgeability of this chasm, separating the thing-in-itself and its 
associated phenomena, does not permit one to induce a direct relation between a change in 
phenomenon and a change in noumenon.  Such correlation, for Kant, must always be mere 
speculation; there exists no causal connection uniting phenomenology and ontology.  To insist 
upon such a connection would be a failure to respect the epistemological boundaries of 
reason, tantamount to a category error.
If we hope to ground our phenomenological claim in Being, then it is precisely the 
relationship of these two fields—phenomenology and ontology—which must be explicated. 
For this we must return to Michel Henry and his seminal essay: Quatre principes de la 
phénoménologie.  
          151 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 
trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 364.
61
§2
In the Quatre principes, Henry attempts to uncover the four fundamental 
presuppositions underlying phenomenological research from Husserl forward.  Although the 
entirety of his project is profoundly important for the history and continuing development of 
phenomenology, it is his first principle which is of particular concern our project.  He opens 
the work:
“La phénoménologie repose sur quatre principes qu’elle revendique explicitement 
comme ses fondements. Le premier: « autant d’apparence, autant d’être » est 
emprunté à l’école de Marburg. À cette proposition équivoque, en raison de la 
double signification du terme d’« apparence », nous préférons cet énoncé rigoureux 
: « autant d’apparaître, autant d’être ».”152 
If we might follow Henry's train of thought regarding this principle, then we must 
begin as he does, with the recognition of an apparent equality.  This principle—“as much as 
appearing, as much as being,”—seems, at its face, to establish nothing more than a simple 
identity.  Henry recognizes this fact, commenting, “Le premier principe établit une 
corrélation décisive entre apparaître et être.”153  Yet, when pursued beyond its face value, this 
simple correlation appears to disintegrate.  
Henry continues, “L’identité de l’apparaître et de l’être se résout dans la fondation du 
second par le premier. Identité d’essence veut bien dire ici qu’il n’y a à l'œuvre qu’un seul et 
même pouvoir, mais ce pouvoir c’est celui de l’apparaître.”154  Being, outside of its 
appearance, must be recognized as simply nothing [l’être n’est rien], an utter lack or 
privation.  Because of this absolute reliance of Being upon appearing, the earlier claim of 
identity must be radicalized: not only is phenomenology on equal footing with ontology, but 
          152  "Phenomenology rests upon four principles which it claims explicitly as its foundations.  The first: 
“as much as appearance, as being” is borrowed from the Marburg School.  Instead of this ambiguous 
proposition, because of the double significance of the term “appearance,” we prefer the strict statement: “as 
much as appearing, as being.”” [my own translation] Henry, Quatre principes de la phénoménologie: 3.
          153  "The first principle establishes a decisive correlation between appearing and being.” [my translation] 
Ibid.: 4.
          154 "The identity of appearance and of being is resolved in the foundation of the second by the first.  The 
identity of the essence means that there is at work only one and the same power, but this power is the one of 
appearing.” [my translation] Ibid.: 4.
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more strongly, ontology itself is grounded within phenomenology.  This understanding was 
alluded to earlier in our work and may be seen as a complete inversion of the traditional 
ontological hierarchy.  
Yet, Henry's intensification of phenomenology's project continues beyond even this 
elevation above ontology.  To argue that Being only “is” in so far as appearing appears may 
be read as a hierarchical assertion, but, perhaps more radically, it can also be recognized as 
an identity: an identity of a distinctly different character than our previous correlation.  This 
identity of phenomenology and ontology is not merely a mutuality or equality, but instead, 
ontology is fully dissolved into phenomenology.  To locate Being within appearing is to 
elevate appearing not only to principal concept, but single concept.  “L’être réside dans 
l’apparaître et s’épuise en lui. Ou encore : il n’y a aucun être qui serait en soi différent de 
l’apparaître de l’apparaître, qui ne se réduirait pas purement et simplement à celui-ci.”155  
While such bold assertions may be recognized as a rejection of the traditional Kantian 
framework, it must also be recognized that, from a certain perspective, it is simply a 
radicalization of Kant's own project.  For, although Kant divided the world into phenomena 
and noumena, it was the former alone which could be thought as a subject of study. 
Phenomenology, like Fichte's transcendental idealism before it, has simply recognized that 
this concept, the noumena, possesses no functional role in the Kantian system.  Instead of 
working to identify this mysterious being (as perhaps Schopenhauer may be understood), one 
must come to recognize that its essence is already contained within the essence of 
phenomena.  There are no noumena, because phenomena possess their own Being.  
Let us now return to our original problematic, the question “is a change in mode-of-
appearing necessarily correlative to a change in Being?.” In light of our disintegration of 
ontology into phenomenology, such a question instantly loses not only its force, but moreover 
its sense. If being is nothing more than the appearance of appearing, then this question is 
          155 "Being resides in appearing and is exhausted in it.  Or again: There is not any being which would be 
in itself different from the appearing of appearing, which is not reduced purely and simply to this later.” [my 
translation] Ibid.: 5.
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reduced to a simple tautology, specifically: “is a change in mode-of-appearing necessarily 
correlative to a change in appearing?.” To this we must respond, at threat of violating the 
most basic law of identity, with an undeniable affirmative.  
§3
"Releasment toward things and openness 
to the mystery belong together.
They grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world 
in a totally different way."
-Heidegger156
This reconstructive hypothesis is certainly shocking.  To identify Being as anything 
other than the firm fixity of substance seems to lend itself to an absurd relativism.  This 
accusation of relativism has been cast against nearly every thinker who identified this 
fundamental instability at the root of Being.   Heraclitus, Nietzsche, and Derrida are merely a 
few examples of those who have been disparaged for such challenges.   Yet, even among the 
classic pillars of philosophy and in particular Hegel, this ambiguity can be found in the form 
of the dialectic. “The original character of the German dialectic...lies in medieval alchemy,” 
which, “by claiming to make gold out of lead...implies... that the ground of reality is not 
made up of fixed things, of immutable elements, but that it is instead change.”157  In this 
sense, our recognition of Being as fundamentally indeterminate is not novel, but merely an 
extension of a tradition: founded in Boehme, extended through the German Idealists, and (by 
way of Schelling) deeply imbedded in Heidegger, Henry, and phenomenology as such.  
It is for this reason that this ambiguity and its associated reconstructive capacity are already 
present in even the most basic tenants of phenomenology.  If “what “is” only is in so far as it 
shows itself,”158 then any alteration of this “showing” must necessarily correlate to an 
alteration in this “being.”  
          156  Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1966): 55.
          157 Michel Henry, Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality trans. Kathleen McLaughlin (Bloomington: 
University of Indiana Press, 1983): 71
          158 Henry, I am the Truth: 14
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The consequences of this ambiguity upon our phenomenology of parable are deep. 
The parabolic experience, that moment when the parable asks one to “take up” a world—that 
is, to reorient one's relationship to beings—cannot be understood as a simple alteration of 
interpretive or hermeneutic lens.  Instead, it must be recognized that this reorientation is at its 
core a restructuring; an alteration of the very Being of beings.  When one adopts the world of 
the parable, reality itself changes.  
It is here that we have arrived at the essence of the parable, the essence that has been 
the motivation of our investigation as a whole.  It is only now, after our extensive 
examinations of the nature of the world and of Being that we are in a position to finally 
clearly delimit this phenomenon.  The parable is a short narrative or story which challenges 
one to take up a world, a nexus of relationality, and to thereby fundamentally change the 
Being of beings, the reality of lived experience.  
§4
At this point in our discussion it may be helpful for us to recapitulate, briefly, our 
initial question and recall the path upon which we have traveled.  Our investigation arose, it 
might be remembered, as a search for an essence: the essence of the parable.  Our work began 
with a simple guiding quote, “No proof of any kind is offered by scriptural parables or by a 
parabolic reading of scripture.  Parables show, they do not prove.”159  From this arose our first 
determinate question, what does a parable show, when it shows something?  Already, the path 
of our investigation was set before us; for what methodology, but phenomenology itself, 
might permit an investigation of appearance?  
Following our foray into the nature of phenomenological theology, we were 
positioned to begin our investigation with an analysis of time.  Already, the complexity of 
parabolic interpretation was revealed, for parables must be read in light of three distinct, and 
often competing, temporalities.  They have been written by a particular author at a 
          159  Hart, Meister Eckhart: 5.
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determinate point in world-history, they are built around the “in that time...” of the narrative, 
and they attempt to speak into the eternity of universality. 
Establishing the topology of our discussion as the transcendental structures of Being, 
specifically the “world,” we explored the tradition and development of “world” in 
phenomenology.  There, we established the necessity of engaging the world as a subjective 
phenomenon.  More importantly, we recognized the importance of the world as an active 
mediation point between the I and its objects, as a nexus of relationality, as a key constituent 
of the phenomenalization of phenomena.  Furthermore, through an examination of the 
tradition of the existential/phenomenological interpretation of parable, particularly that of its 
founder Robert Funk, we were able to recognize the principal role of parable as world-
presenting.  Of particular importance became the parabolic experience, that moment where 
the audience of the parable is asked to “take up” the parabolic world.  Finally, our 
investigation took its most important turn, as the “taking up” became our explicit focus and it 
became increasingly clear that the reorientation of the parable is nothing less than a 
restructuring of beings themselves.  This, it seems, is the essence of the parable.  
With our investigation as a whole before us, the importance of this restructuring can 
be seen in its full clarity.  While a simple answer to our initial question—what does a parable 
show, when it shows?—might simply be “a world,” this does not recognize the depth of the 
parabolic call.  The parable does not merely show a world, but a world in which the 
listener/reader is being asked to live.  The parable does not simply offer a list of actions, some 
approved, others banned; nor does it merely offer an interpretive nexus, an alternate way of 
reading reality.  Instead, the parable offers an actual reality; it offers a glimpse at a possible 
configuration of the life-world [lebenswelt] of the individual and challenges the individual to 
occupy this reality.
Such a claim may appear radical or even absurd.  Yet, the restructuring of being-itself 
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is a phenomenon that is common to anyone who lives in a world saturated with meaning.160 
For who, upon discovering an object of the past, has not found this item invested with a 
overwhelming depth of meaning, a meaning of such poignancy and fecundity as to rip the 
object from its common reality—its presence-to-hand, its mere "thingness"—and reinstate it 
within the world in such a way as to fundamentally reorient its mode-of-being, that is, its very 
reality.  Consider, once again, our trite example of the hammer. As this object rushes through 
its various appearances, its various phenomenalities, what of the hammer remains consistent? 
Investigated, it is a complex convergence of various materials; found, it is a single absolutely 
unified object; used, it appears translucent, nearly invisible.  It is only through a constant 
recourse to a single mode-of-appearing, that is, the present-to-hand, that this perceived 
change could even be conceivably denied.  But, for what reason are we to privilege this single 
mode-of-appearing?  On the contrary, phenomenology grants all intuition the authority of 
evidence, even that which seems absurd.   
It must therefore be recognized that the being of objects is unstable and that 
ontological construction is a fundamental aspect of human life.  We constantly participate in 
the construction of a world around us.  Certainly, this is not to advocate a solipsism or 
absolute idealism, but merely the recognition that we are active participants in our world.  As 
Funk writes, “As actant however, I am not merely captive to an inherited or habituated life-
world: I do indeed operate within that world, but also operate on it.”161  
To author or speak a parable is therefore to recognize, implicitly at least, this 
constructive capacity of humanity.  It is to reject quietism and to recognize that humans are 
essentially responsible for the world in which they live.  To be called to “take up” a world is 
to be respected as a creator and asked to bear the burden of one's own experiences and 
relations.  When Kafka presents a world in which absolute value is always just out of reach, 
          160 And as Merleau-Ponty writes, “because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning.” 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception: xxii.
          161  Funk, “From Parable to Gospel”: 157.
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he is asking the individual to take up this absurd world and make it ones own.  When Jesus 
proclaims that “the kingdom of God is like...,” he does not seek the faith of simplistic belief, 
he does not simply ask one to enter, but to build; he seeks the creation of this kingdom as a 
reality upon earth.  The kingdom is here because he lives in it, and calls out for others to live 
in it as well.
"Then it takes on the colour of God, and shame becomes honour, 
bitterness is sweetness and the deepest darkness become the clearest light. 
Then everything takes its flavor from God and becomes divine,
 for everything conforms itself to God."
-Eckhart162
          162  Meister Eckhart, “The Talks of Instruction” in Selected Writings trans. Oliver Davies (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1994): 20-21.
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